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A CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING IN NEED OF
ADJUSTMENT: ON DEFAMATION, BREACHES
OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AND THE CHURCH
MARK P. STRASSER*
INTRODUCTION
Religious disputes arise in a variety of contexts. Sometimes,
parties within a religious organization disagree about who has the most
accurate interpretation of religious doctrine;' at other times, congregants
disagree about who should lead the congregation;2 at another church, a
member believes that he or she has been harmed by other congregants or,
perhaps, by the church's spiritual leaders. 3 Some of these religious
disputes between religious parties are settled internally. On occasion,
however, at least one of the parties to a religious dispute seeks
satisfaction in a civil court, raising the important issue of determining
under what conditions, if any, the civil courts may hear disputes
involving religious parties.
The jurisprudence is well-settled with respect to the principle
that civil courts cannot decide certain kinds of religious disputes, such as
which party is correctly interpreting religious doctrine.4 Yet, the
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus,
Ohio.
1. See infra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part II.B.1.
4. See e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871) ("In this class
of cases [involving the interpretation of religious doctrine] we think the rule of
action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of
the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a
preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their
application to the case before them.").
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jurisprudence is unsettled in other areas. For example, state courts still
disagree about whether they may decide cases based on allegations that a
religious leader has defamed or revealed the private confidence of a
congregant. Some courts have cited the constitutional limitations of the
court in declining to hear these cases. Still others have developed
approaches taking into account both the constitutional limitations on the
courts and the dignitary interests adversely impacted by the public
dissemination of statements that are knowingly false or that reveal
7
private, embarrassing information. Regrettably, there is no consensus on
where the relevant dividing lines should be drawn.
This Article discusses the conditions under which suits against
religious parties for defamation or for the publication of private facts are
justiciable. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the particular
issues raised here, and the lower courts addressing these issues have
adopted a variety of approaches ranging from a fairly narrow limitation
on defamation or publication claims to a robust limitation that immunizes
a whole host of otherwise tortious practices from civil review.
Analysis proceeds in two parts. Part I of this Article discusses
the developing jurisprudence regarding the conditions under which civil
courts can hear disputes involving religious parties. Part II then examines
the varying approaches adopted by courts when deciding which
defamation and invasion of privacy cases are justiciable. The Article
concludes by offering suggestions about how to best protect important
individual dignitary interests implicated in such cases while also
respecting the constitutional limitations imposed on civil courts hearing
suits involving religious parties.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DISCUSSION OF THE LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL
COURTS HEARING DISPUTES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS PARTIES
The Supreme Court long ago began addressing the conditions
under which civil courts can hear disputes involving religious parties.
The cases have involved a variety of contexts, and the Court has often
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra notes 246-258 and accompany text.
7. See infra notes 235-245, 280-296 and accompanying text.
8. The Court's earliest decision with regard to disputes involving religious
parties was Watson v. Jones, discussed infra in Part I.A.
326 [Vol. 12
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(but not always) offered a nuanced view balancing competing interests.
Generally, while the Court has held that civil courts cannot decide
theological disputes or decide which religious leader best serves the
interests of their religious institutions, the Court has permitted civil
courts to hear cases involving religious parties in limited secular
contexts.
A. Property Disputes
The Court has heard cases where the parties disagreed about who
rightfully represented the church and thus who rightfully owned church
property. For example, Watson v. Jones9 involved a dispute between a
local church and the hierarchical church of which it was a part. The
majority of the church leaders of a local Louisville church were pro-
slavery, while a majority of the members of the hierarchical church were
anti-slavery.o The views of the latter group coincided with those of the
hierarchical church.'
The question before the Court was which group constituted the
local churchl2 and thus had the right to use the church and church
property. 13 First, the Court explained that this was both a schism between
members of the local church' 4 as well as a division between certain
members of the local church and the hierarchical church." The
hierarchical church had already decided which faction within the local
9. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
10. See id. at 691-93.
11. Id. at 690-91 ("[T]he General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church at its
annual meetings expressed in Declaratory Statements or Resolutions, its sense of the
obligation of all good citizens to support the Federal government in that struggle;
and when, by the proclamation of President Lincoln, emancipation of the slaves of
the States in insurrection was announced, that body also expressed views favorable
to emancipation, and adverse to the institution of slavery.").
12. Id. at 692 ("In January, 1866, the congregation of the Walnut Street
Church became divided in the manner stated above, each asserting that it constituted
the church.").
13. Id. at 681 ("This was a litigation which grew out of certain disturbances ..
. and which resulted in a division of its members into two distinct bodies, each
claiming the exclusive use of the property held and owned by that local church.").
14. Id. at 717 ("This is a case of a division or schism in the church.").
15. See id. at 726.
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church was entitled to use the facilities, and the Court had to decide
whether to enforce the hierarchical church's decision about who
constituted the church.
The Watson Court explained that "whenever the questions of
discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been
decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final,
and as binding on them . ... In other words, the Court held that the
Constitution requires civil courts to defer to religious authorities with
respect to the proper interpretation of religious beliefs and practices,
including the correct doctrinal determination regarding the permissibility
of slavery.' 9 A policy of deference permits the state to remain neutral
among competing religious beliefs and practices, and does not put the
state in the position of choosing one religious view over another. Courts
must maintain neutrality because "the law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."2 0
The Watson Court then turned to when secular courts would
have jurisdiction over seemingly religious disputes. For example, "if the
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church should undertake to try
one of its members for murder, and punish him with death or
imprisonment, its sentence would be of no validity in a civil court or
anywhere else."21 By the same token, if the Presbyterian Assembly
"should . . . entertain jurisdiction as between [two members] as to their
16. See id at 692-93 ("On the 1st of June, 1867, the Presbytery and Synod
recognized by Watson and his party, were declared by the General Assembly to be
'in no sense a true and lawful Synod and Presbytery in connection with and under
the care and authority of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the
United States of America;' and were permanently excluded from connection with or
representation in the Assembly. By the same resolution the Synod and Presbytery
adhered to by those whom Watson and his party opposed were declared to be the
true and lawful Presbytery of Louisville, and Synod of Kentucky.").
17. Id. at 727.
18. See Mark A. Hicks, Comment, The Art of Ecclesiastical War: Using the
Legal System to Resolve Church Disputes, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 531, 551-52 (2012)
("The hierarchical deference approach, which was created by the Supreme Court in
Watson v. Jones, requires courts to defer to hierarchical organizations in respect to
religious matters.").
19. See Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
20. Id. at 728.
21. Id. at 733.
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individual right to property, real or personal, the right in no sense
depending on ecclesiastical questions, its decision would be utterly
disregarded by any civil court where it might be set up." 22
Thus, civil courts could quite properly exercise jurisdiction over
a property dispute whose resolution did not in any way depend upon the
resolution of a religious controversy. However, courts should not attempt
to resolve issues requiring an authoritative interpretation of a particular
religious belief or practice. As the Watson Court noted, "it is easy to see
that if the civil courts are to inquire into . . . the doctrinal theology, the
usages and customs, [this in effect] . . . would deprive [ecclesiastical]
bodies of the right of construing their own church laws."2 3
Consider Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 24another case in which two local
churches decided to sever their relations with the hierarchical church.2 5
The local churches claimed that the hierarchical church was departing
from "the doctrine and practice in force at the time of affiliation." 26 The
jury deciding whether the local or hierarchical church owned the
contested lands was told that "Georgia law implies a trust of local church
property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that
the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the
,,27
time of affiliation by the local churches. Thus, Georgia law reserved
local church property for the hierarchical church only if the hierarchical
church did not betray the principles that had induced the local church's
28
affiliation in the first place.
If indeed local church property is held in trust for the
hierarchical church only if the hierarchical church has remained true to
its principles, then someone must decide whether the hierarchical church
has in fact remained true to its principles. Georgia law entrusted that duty
to the jury as the trier of fact, who were told to decide "whether the
actions of the general church 'amount to a fundamental or substantial
abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the (general church),
22. Id.
23. Id
24. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
25. Id. at 442.
26. Id
27. Id. at 443.
28. Id.
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so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes
for which the (general church) was founded."' 29 In this particular case,
the jury found for the local churches, 30 a decision affirmed by the
Georgia Supreme Court.3 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed.32 Citing Watson with
approval,3 3 the Court explained that "the civil courts [have] no role in
determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property
disputes." 34 However, the Court was not suggesting that civil courts
should therefore decline jurisdiction whenever church property is at
issue. Rather, "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in
all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing'
churches to which property is awarded." 3 5
The Court had an opportunity to develop the neutral principles of
law approach more fully in another case arising out of Georgia. In Jones
v. Wolf,36 the Court addressed "a dispute over the ownership of church
property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a
hierarchical church organization." 3 7 The Wolf Court held that there was
"little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve this
question" because the "State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the
peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum
where the ownership of church property can be determined
conclusively."38 Nonetheless, there are certain constitutional limitations
imposed on the courts; for example, "the First Amendment prohibits civil
courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious
doctrine and practice."39 Such a limitation entails that "civil courts defer
29. Id. at 443-44.
30. Id. at 440.
31. Id. at 444.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 452.
34. Id. at 447.
35. Id. at 449.
36. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
37. Id. at 597.
38. Id. at 602 (citing in part to Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445
(1969)).
39. Id. (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710
(1976); Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970);
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
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to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest
court of a hierarchical church organization." 40 The Court further held (1)
that these principles were consistent with a "'neutral principals of law'
approach" and (2) that, as long as the above mentioned limitations were
observed, "the First Amendment does not dictate that a state must follow
a particular method of resolving church property disputes." 4 1
The Wolf Court was aware that application of the neutral
principles of law approach might pose some difficulty.42 For example,
Georgia law required that church documents be examined "for language
of trust in favor of the general church."4 3 The Court cautioned that "a
civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely
secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining
whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a
trust." 4 4 Further, in a case in which it was necessary for religious terms to
be interpreted, "the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal
issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." 45
Yet, the Court's recognition that applying neutral principles
would sometimes be difficult was not meant to suggest that civil courts
should simply defer to religious authorities. The Wolf Court expressly
rejected that "the First Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of
compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church property
disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved." 4 6
Instead, civil courts can make their own judgments about the controversy
40. Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 733-34 (1872)).
41. Id. at 602-03.
42. Id. at 604 ("This is not to say that the application of the neutral-principles
approach is wholly free of difficulty.").
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709); see also Omar T. Mohammedi,
Sharia-Compliant Wills: Principles, Recognition, and Enforcement, 57 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 259, 272 (2013) ("[T]he 'neutral principles' approach applied by the
Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf prohibits courts from becoming involved in
disagreements over religious doctrine, but allows courts to examine undisputed
points of religious doctrine.").
46. Wolf 443 U.S. at 605.
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at issue, as long as those courts are careful to make only secular
judgments.47
B. The Installation of Religious Leaders
The Court has examined several cases where individuals sought
help from civil courts because they believed that they had wrongly been
denied a church leadership position. At issue in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America 48was the
identity of the individual who had the right to occupy and use the St.
Nicholas Cathedral in New York.49 Leonty, "the Metropolitan of All
America and Canada, the Archbishop of New York," was elected to "his
ecclesiastical office" by a convention of representatives of American
churches.50 Leonty claimed the right to occupy and use St. Nicholas
Cathedral by virtue of that election.5 In contrast, Benjamin Fedchenkoff
based his right to the use and possession of the Cathedral "on an
appointment in 1934 by the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian
Orthodox Church . . . as Archbishop of the Archdiocese of North
America and the Aleutian Islands." 52 Thus, the two men both claimed to
be the Archbishop entitled to the occupation and use of the New York
cathedral, one as appointed by a convention of American churches and
one as appointed by the Church's supreme authority in Russia.
The New York Court of Appeals held that "the prelate appointed
by the Moscow ecclesiastical authorities was not entitled to the
Cathedral" in light of a New York law that transferred ownership of the
Cathedral and other churches from "the central governing hierarchy of
47. See Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839, 853 (2012) (citations omitted) ("In Jones v. Wolf, in
1979, the Court held that civil courts could decide a church property dispute on the
basis of the church's secular documents and neutral principles of law, even if the
court reached a result opposite to that of the highest church authorities.").
48. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
49. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 96 (1952).
50. See id at 96, n.1.
51. See id. at 96 (discussing the "claimed right of the corporation [of the
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the Russian Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Moscow and the Holy
Synod" to the American branch of the Russian Orthodox Church.53 The
Kedroff Court held that the law transferring ownership to American
branches was invalid as a violation of constitutional guarantees.54
The reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals is important to
consider. The New York Court of Appeals had previously upheld the
New York law "on the theory that [the Russian Church in America]
would most faithfully carry out the purposes of the religious trust. 56In
enacting the law, the New York Legislature had been concerned that a
church headquartered in Moscow might be controlled or influenced by
the communist regime, and the New York Court of Appeals supported
this rationale.5 7 However, the United States Supreme Court explained
that because the Russian Orthodox Church had "no schism over faith or
doctrine" with regard to who controlled the Russian Orthodox Church in
America, the lower courts erred by favoring the policies of the New York
Legislature over the religious doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church.
53. Id. at 97, 107.
54. Id. at 107.
55. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am. v.
Kedroff, 96 N.E.2d 56, 74 (N.Y. 1950).
56. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 109.
57. 96 N.E.2d at 74 ("On the basis of these facts, and the facts stated supra and
no doubt other facts we know not of, our Legislature concluded that the Moscow
Patriarchate was no longer capable of functioning as a true religious body, but had
become a tool of the Soviet Government primarily designed to implement its foreign
policy."); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Church
Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431,
449 (2011) (discussing the New York law at issue in Kedroff as one which "had
emerged from legitimate concerns that the church's hierarchy in Moscow was
controlled by the Communist regime")); Christopher Charles Johnson, The
Fractured Catholic Church: Why Civil Courts Would Defer to the Governing Body
of the Episcopal Church in Cases of Diocesan Departure, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV.
829, 843 (2010) (referring to the New York law at issue in Kedroff as "a Cold War
New York statute aimed at fighting communism within the American branch of the
Russian Orthodox Church" and the New York courts' decisions upholding this law
as "a neutral attempt to ferret out communist infiltration of an American church").
58. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 120; see also Mark Strasser, When Churches Divide:
On Neutrality, Deference, and Unpredictability, 32 Hamline L. Rev. 427, 450 (2009)
("[T]he Kedroff Court suggested that the civil courts have a very limited role to play
when adjudicating property disputes between religious parties, and that role does not
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
The Kedroff Court made clear that "when the property right follows as an
incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical
issues, the church rule controls." 59
Kedroff protects the right of religious institutions to choose their
own clergy. Such a choice has "federal constitutional protection as a part
of the free exercise of religion against state interference.,,o That said,
however, the Kedroff Court expressly noted that such protection attaches
only "where no improper methods of choice are proven." 61
Just as civil courts must defer on matters of religious substantive
law, civil courts must defer to religious courts when seeking to determine
the procedural protections offered under religious law. In Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada
v. Milivojevich, 62the Illinois Supreme Court had held that church
proceedings regarding a Bishop's defrocking "were procedurally and
substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother
Church and were therefore arbitrary and invalid." 6 3 However, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the inquiries made by the
Illinois Supreme Court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and
polity and the court's actions pursuant thereto contravened the First and
Fourteenth Amendments."64 Basically, the Illinois court offered an
authoritative interpretation of the due process protections guaranteed
under religious law, and found that those guarantees had been violated.
The Milivojevich Court further explained that:
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made
without extensive inquiry by civil courts into
religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
include the ability to determine which entity was remaining true to religious
doctrine.").
59. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 120-21.
60. Id. at 116.
61. Id.; see also Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous:
On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 400, 414 (2012) (citations omitted) ("Yet, even Kedroff includes an
important qualification with respect to something as central as the choice of clergy,
namely, that such decisions must not be disturbed by the state 'where no improper
methods of choice are proven."').
62. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
63. Id. at 698.
64. Id.
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Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not
disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
65
must accept such decisions as binding on them.
Because the Illinois Supreme Court had rejected the religious
judicatory's determination that defrocking of the Bishop had respected
66
due process guarantees, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
Yet, it is important not to overstate the Milivojevich holding. The
Court struck down the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of an
interpretation of religious law offered by religious authorities, where the
Illinois court had instead substituted its own interpretation of religious
law. Civil courts simply do not have the expertise to second-guess
religious authorities about the proper interpretation of religious belief
and practice. Such a prohibition does not mean that civil courts cannot
second-guess religious authorities about whether civil law has been
67
violated. On the contrary, the jurisprudence established by Wolf
Milivojevich, and the various cases discussed above is that that civil
courts must not decide religious issues but can decide civil issues, even
in cases involving religious parties.68 A separate issue is whether the
Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
65. Id. at 709 (citing Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S.
367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
66. Id. at 698.
67. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 418 ("While the federal courts are not to
decide ecclesiastical matters, they are permitted to use neutral principles of law to
resolve church disputes."). Some commentators seem not to appreciate this point.
See, e.g., Ryan W. Jaziri, Note, Fixing a Crack in the Wall of Separation: Why the
Religion Clauses Preclude Adjudication of Sexual Harassment Claims Brought by
Ministers, 45 NEw ENG. L. REV. 719, 741 (2011) ("At a minimum, where a religious
organization has a formal governing procedure for resolving sexual harassment
disputes, civil courts must accept their decisions as final under Watson and
Milivojevich.").
68. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 426 ("The cases in which church property
was not at issue also suggest that the courts can play an active role in assuring that
generally applicable laws are enforced, as long as those laws do not target religion.
While none of these cases suggest that the courts should be making decisions about
theology, they do suggest that religious institutions are not immune from generally
applicable laws including non-discrimination laws, as long as the basis of the law is
not religious in nature.").
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and School v. E.E.O.C.69has modified the existing jurisprudence to offer
much more robust immunity for religious institutions.70
Milivojevich reinforced two distinct prongs of the jurisprudence:
(1) civil courts are not to dictate the authoritative interpretation of
religious beliefs, customs, or policies, and (2) civil courts are not to
determine who should lead religious groups." The latter mandate was
reaffirmed in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Court explained that
"[r]equiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or
punishing a church for failing to do so . . . interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the
selection of those who will personify its beliefs."7 2
Hosanna-Tabor involved a minister's suit for wrongful
73termination of employment. The Court reasoned that an award of tort
damages "would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an
unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First
Amendment than an order overturning the termination." 74 The Court
further held that because the Church's decision to fire a minister "is the
church's alone," whether or not "it is made for a religious reason," the
Church could not be subjected to tort liability for such an employment
. . 75decision.
The Hosanna-Tabor Court addressed a very narrow issue-"an
employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister,
challenging her church's decision to fire her."76 But at the same time, the
Court expressly refused to address whether the Constitution "bars other
69. 565 U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
70. See Strasser, supra note 61, at 448 ("Some courts will read Hosanna-Tabor
narrowly as only applying to certain employment actions, while other courts will
read it as providing a broad-based immunity for religious institutions, even though
such a broad-based immunity lacks grounding in past jurisprudence."). For further
discussion of Hosanna-Tabor, see infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
72. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
73. Id. at _, 132 S. Ct. at 709 ("Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of
reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees.").
74. Id
75. Id. ("Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception,
the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit
against her religious employer.").
76. Id. at -, 132 S. Ct. at 710.
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract
or tortious conduct by their religious employers."n Thus, the Hosanna-
Tabor Court did not address the issue of concern here-whether or to
what extent the Constitution bars suits against religious leaders for
defamation or invasion of privacy. Lower courts have been have long
attempted to address that issue but have thus far been unable to reach a
consensus about the conditions under which such suits may proceed.
II. ACTIONS ALLEGING DEFAMATION OR INVASION OF PRIVACY
Over the past several decades, lower courts have addressed the
conditions under which tort actions could be brought against religious
leaders for defamation or publication of private facts. Depending upon
the jurisdiction, factors that have played a role in whether such suits
could proceed include: (1) whether the injured individual was a member
78of the congregation, (2) whether the allegedly injurious statement had a
religious rather than secular meaning,79 (3) whether there was a religious
duty to make the public statement,80 and (4) the identity of the audience
hearing the statement.8 However, courts have not yet agreed on a
uniform approach, leading to inconsistent results and a jurisprudence
without a firm foundation.
A. Suits by Members of the Clergy
Several cases involve suits by members of the clergy claiming
defamation or wrongful publication of private facts. Decisions have
varied greatly with respect to the conditions, if any, under which clergy
may bring such suits. Courts have also been unable to offer a principled
foundation upon which some consensus can be reached. While courts
have agreed, and will continue to agree, about the proper resolution of
certain kinds of cases, they have made little headway in forming a
77. Id.
78. See Smith v. Calgary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000);
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
79. See Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal. App. 3d 297 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
80. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
81. See Guinn, 775 P.2d 766.
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jurisprudence that provides both consistency and fairness across a wide
range of cases.
In Alberts v. Devine,82 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts examined whether religious leaders were potentially liable
for inducing a psychiatrist to reveal confidential information about a
83
patient. William Alberts, a minister, consulted a psychiatrist, Donald
Devine, with the understanding that their discussion would be
confidential. 84 Devine disclosed information to Bishop Carroll, or to his
representative, about Alberts's diagnosis. Carroll and the District
Superintendent of the Conference, Barclay, communicated that
information to numerous third parties.86 Further, Carroll allegedly
publicly express his belief, based on "competent consultation," that
Alberts "was mentally ill and therefore unappointable." 87 Alberts was
not reappointed as a minister of a church, allegedly as a result of these
disclosures, thereby incurring "considerable loss of earning capacity and
other financial losses, damage to his reputation, and great mental anguish
requiring medical treatment."8 8
One issue was whether Devine was potentially liable for
divulging privileged information.89 A different issue of more relevance
here was whether Alberts's superiors could be held liable for inducing a
physician to reveal confidential information. 90 Holding that liability
could be imposed against the religious leaders who had convinced the
82. 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985).
83. Id. at 113 ("Church minister brought action against his psychiatrist and two
of his clerical superiors alleging that superiors had induced psychiatrist to disclose
confidential information and had used that information to cause minister not to be
reappointed.").





89. See id. at 118 (citing Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527 (Or.
1985)) ("The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently held that a patient in that State
has a civil right of recovery if a physician discloses without privilege confidential
information obtained from the patient in the course of the physician-patient
relationship.... Patients in Massachusetts deserve no less protection.").
90. See id. at 121 (describing the conditions under which an individual who
"induces a physician wrongfully to disclose information about a patient, may be held
liable to the patient for the damages that flow from that disclosure").
338 [Vol. 12
psychiatrist to reveal confidential information, the court explained that it
was adopting "an application of the general rule that a plaintiff may hold
liable one who intentionally induces another to commit any tortious act
that results in damage to the plaintiff."9'
At issue here was whether the First Amendment immunized the
actions of Alberts's supervisors, who allegedly had a religious "duty to
obtain information about Alberts's mental and emotional well-being ...
."92 Further, there was an additional element to consider. As the
Massachusetts court recognized, "the First Amendment prohibits civil
courts from intervening in disputes concerning religious doctrine,
discipline, faith, or internal organization."93 But if the courts were
precluded from examining the internal governance structure, including
whether Alberts would have been reappointed but for the wrongful
disclosure of confidential information, then there would have been no
way to establish that the economic harm associated with his non-
reappointment had been caused by the breach of confidentiality.94
The Alberts court rejected that the church leaders were immune
from suit,95 reasoning that a "controversy concerning whether a church
rule grants religious superiors the civil right to induce a psychiatrist to
violate the duty of silence that he owes to a patient, who happens to be a
minister, is not a dispute about religious faith or doctrine nor about
church discipline or internal organization." 96 The court's point needs to
be analyzed. Certainly, there may be a church rule imposing a religious
duty on religious superiors to find out all they can about someone who
wishes to be reappointed to the ministry, and whether such a religious
duty exists is not a matter for the civil courts to determine. However, a
91. Id. (citing inter alia Nelson v. Nason, 177 N.E.2d 887 (Mass. 1961)).
92. Id at 122.
93. Id. (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979)).
94. See id. (noting the defendants' argument that "the principle enunciated in
the cases cited above precludes judicial inquiry into the merit of Alberts's claims
against them and into the process by which the members of the church voted to retire
Alberts").
95. See id. (disagreeing with the defendants' First Amendment preclusion
argument).
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)) ("It
is clear that the assessment of an individual's qualifications to be a minister, and the
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separate issue is whether the existence of such a religious duty translates
into the existence of a civil right or, perhaps more felicitously, an
immunity from suit for fulfilling that religious obligation. The latter issue
is not itself a matter of faith, doctrine, or discipline, and thus is
appropriately a matter for the civil court to decide, especially if there are
important secular interests served by imposing tort liability in such a
98
case.
The Massachusetts court noted that a law "regulat[ing] or
prevent[ing] religiously motivated conduct does not violate the First
Amendment if the State's interest in the law's enforcement outweighs the
burden that the law imposes on the free exercise of religion." 99 Basically,
the court made two points: (1) the existence of a religious duty does not
automatically translate into either a civil duty or an immunity from civil
liability for fulfilling one's religious duty; and (2) whether the civil law
can impose a burden on the fulfillment of religious duties depends on the
importance of the implicated secular interests in discouraging individuals
from performing the actions that would constitute fulfilling the duties at
.100
issue.
The Alberts court also suggested that internal governance
protections are not triggered by a "controversy concerning the causal
connection between a psychiatrist's disclosure of confidential
information and a minister's failure to gain reappointment . . . .,," But it
is hard to see why that is so. Exactly what was at issue was the causal
role played by the wrongfully divulged information in the decision not to
reappoint Alberts, and that issue could not be resolved without delving
into the process by which the reappointment decision was made. Suppose
that Alberts would not have been reappointed in any event because of an
overwhelming need to appoint someone with a fresh doctrinal
perspective. In that event, the causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the denial of Alberts's reappointment could not be
established.
appointment and retirement of ministers, are ecclesiastical matters entitled to
constitutional protection against judicial or other State interference.").
98. See id.
99. See id. at 123.
100. See id.
101. See id.at 122.
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The Alberts court reasoned that "the First Amendment does not
bar judicial inquiry into the church's proceedings culminating in
Alberts's failure to gain reappointment."1 02 While it is unclear whether
the Alberts court was accurately describing the jurisprudence prevailing
at the time,to3 it is quite unlikely that such a view would pass
constitutional muster today. Hosanna-Tabor suggests that courts are
precluded from examining internal decision-making regarding ministerial
employment. But unless courts are able to do so, it is difficult to
understand how Alberts would be able to establish that the breach of
confidentiality had in fact caused his not being reappointed, the Alberts
court's rejection of that argument notwithstanding.104
While the Alberts decision is still cited with approval,tos a
number of different aspects of the opinion should not be conflated,
especially if one wishes to consider how a case like Alberts might be
decided now. Consider a hypothetical case involving a minister, Balberts,
who had been denied reappointment after her psychiatrist had divulged
confidential information. Balberts might well have suffered compensable
harm.106 That is true, even if examining the internal processes of the
102. Id. at 123.
103. Certiorari was denied in Carroll v. Alberts, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985) (mem.).
104. Cf Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. _, _, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)) ("The purpose of the
exception is not to safeguard a church's decision to fire a minister only when it is
made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to select
and control who will minister to the faithful-a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical,'-is
the church's alone.").
105. Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871, 883 (D.C. 2002) (citing Alberts, 479
N.E.2d 113) ("Nor may a church seek confidential medical information from a
pastor's psychiatrist in making a reappointment determination as to that pastor."
citing Alberts, 479 N.E.2d 113); Leary v. Geoghan, No. 990371, 2000 WL 1473579,
at *2 (Mass. Super. June 28, 2000) (citing Emp't Div., Dep't of Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990); Alberts, 479 N.E.2d at 122-23) ("[T]he fact that religious doctrine
justifies conduct does not always and necessarily immunize that conduct from the
sanction of civil law."); Tidman v. Salvation Army, No. 01-A-01-9708-CV00380,
1998 WL 391765, at *6 (Tenn. App. July 15, 1998) (citing Alberts, 479 N.E.2d 113)
("[T]he court held that inducing a physician to breach his patient's confidence and
divulge information to that patient's church superiors did not enjoy First
Amendment protection.").
106. Cf Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort
Liability, and the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381, 397 (Fall
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church to determine whether she would have been reappointed had there
been no disclosure would be precluded under the current interpretation of
constitutional guarantees.
Even if unable to sue for lost income, Balberts might be able to
sue for emotional harm caused by the breach of confidentiality.107 In
addition, she might be able to sue for other harms as well. For example,
the betrayal of confidence by her psychiatrist might adversely impact
Balberts's ability to get well because she might find it difficult, if not
impossible, to trust any therapist, thereby undermining the efficacy of the
treatment that she would need to recover.'o Depending upon the
circumstances and the harms caused, punitive damages might be
available as well. 109 All of these harms could be asserted without
requiring an examination of the internal processes by which the
reappointment decision had been made.
Marshall v. Munro'10 involved a claim by an ordained minister,
Samuel Marshall, that he had been defamed by a religious leader, Neil
Munro,"' when Munro suggested that Marshall was not suitable as a
pastor because Marshall "was divorced, was dishonest, was unable to
2008) ("The Alberts court held, correctly in my view, that even if a rule imposed
upon church authorities a duty to secure confidential medical information, the First
Amendment does not preclude the imposition of liability for violations of physician-
patient confidentiality.").
107. See Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348, 356 (Fla. 2002) ("[W]e can envision
few occurrences more likely to result in emotional distress than having one's
psychotherapist reveal without authorization or justification the most confidential
details of one's life.").
108. See, e.g., Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374, 380 (Pa.
2009) ("The harm arising from a breach [of the physician-patient relationship]
entails not only the mental suffering due to exposure of private information, but also
subsumes an erosion of an essential, confidential relationship between the health
care services provider and the patient.") .
109. Cf Randi v. Long Island Surgi-Ctr., 842 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007) ("We decline to hold that, as a matter of law, the callous, reckless, or
grossly negligent disregard of an individual's right to the privacy and confidentiality
of sensitive medical information-a right protected by the declared public policy of
this State (see Public Health Law § 2803-c[1], [3][fj )-cannot be sufficiently
reprehensible and morally culpable to support an award of exemplary damages ...
110. 845 P.2d 424 (Alaska 1993).
111. Id. at 425 ("Munro is the Executive Presbyter of the Presbytery of Yukon,
Synod of Alaska Northwest, Presbyterian Church (USA).").
perform pastoral duties due to throat surgery, and had made an improper
advance to a member of the Anchorage congregation."ll 2 One of
Munro's duties was to respond to inquiries from other churches that were
conducting searches for new pastors." 3 Because he had simply been
performing his religious duty to respond to a church's inquiry about
Marshall, Munro claimed that civil authorities were precluded from
deciding whether his comments about Marshall were actionable.1 14
While accepting that "employment disputes within churches are
core ecclesiastical concerns outside the jurisdiction of civil courts,"" 5 the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected Munro's assertion that the underlying
dispute was simply about whether Marshall was qualified to be a pastor
and hence was not appropriately considered by the court.l16 The court
reasoned that there was no need for the civil courts to determine whether
Marshall was a suitable pastor. Instead, the court would simply have to
determine whether Munro had "actually said: 1) Marshall was divorced;
2) Marshall was dishonest; 3) Marshall had throat surgery disabling him
as a pastor; and 4) Marshall made improper advances to a member of the
congregation."m Even if Munro had made these statements that would
not end the matter because Munro might still have a defense. The court
noted that if "Munro raises the defenses of truth and of privilege, the
court need only determine if the facts stated were true and if Munro
made the statements with malice (a reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity)."'
Although "employment disputes within churches are core
ecclesiastical concerns outside the jurisdiction of civil courts,"" 9 there
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 427 ("Munro notes his official church duties require him to respond
to inquiries from other churches which are considering 'calling' a particular pastor.
Munro states that the Book of Order requires a pastor to be responsible for a quality
of life and relationships that commend the gospel to all persons. He argues that these
religious factors show this case is intertwined with ecclesiastical duties and warrant
the court's refusal to become involved.").
115. Id. at 427 (footnote omitted).
116. See id. at 428 ("Munro's attempt to characterize the dispute as being over
Marshall's qualifications as a pastor is unpersuasive.").
117. Id.
118. Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. Id. at 427.
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were a few reasons that this case did not seem to fall into the standard
category of church employment disputes making it beyond the reach of
the civil courts. First, Marshall had already been extended a contract,120
so there was no need to examine the internal workings of the church to
make a judgment about whether he was qualified to be a minister there.
Second, Marshall had been told expressly that the contract was being
rescinded because of Munro's derogatory comments,121 obviating the
need to delve into the internal governance procedures of the church to
figure out the cause of the rescission. Finally, Marshall was not suing the
church for breaking the contract; rather, he was suing Munro for the
. . . .122
latter's allegedly malicious interference with an existing contract.
The Alaska court did not offer a chronology of events.12 For
example, it is unclear whether Munro was asked for his opinion about
Marshall's qualifications and, if so, whether that request was made
before or after the employment agreement between Marshall and the
church had been reached.124 Munro testified that "his official church
duties require him to respond to inquiries from other churches which are
considering 'calling' a particular pastor," 2 5 which at least suggests that
he had received a call about Marshall before the church had extended the
offer. On the other hand, Marshall was suing for defamation and
intentional interference with contract,126 which suggests that Munro
already knew that the contract had been made when offering his
assessment of Marshall's qualifications.
120. Id. at 425 ("He accepted a position with the Hillwood Presbyterian
Church of Nashville, Tennessee.").
121. Id. ("When Marshall presented himself to begin his employment, he was
notified that because of derogatory information received from Munro, the church
would not hire him as Pastor.").
122. Id. at 427 ("Marshall argues that ... this case concerns . . . interference
with contract.").
123. See id. at 424.
124. Id. at 425 ("Marshall ... accepted a position with the Hillwood
Presbyterian Church of Nashville, Tennessee. When Marshall presented himself to
begin his employment, he was notified that because of derogatory information
received from Munro, the church would not hire him as Pastor.").
125. Id. at 427.
126. Id. at 428 ("[T]he claims of defamation and interference with contract
should not have been dismissed by the superior court.").
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To be successful in his intentional interference with contract
claim, Marshall would have to show:
1) a contract existed;
2) Munro knew of, and intended to interfere with the contract;
3) Munro did in fact interfere with the contract; and
4) Munro's interference caused Marshall's damages.127
This suggests that Marshall believed Munro already knew that
the contract had been made, not that Munro's advice was being sought to
help the church decide whether to hire Marshall. It seems clear that this
was not the usual case where Munro had been asked his opinion by a
church considering whether to call a particular pastor.
The trial court found that Munro had made the comments while
performing his duty,128 so those comments were presumably made in
response to a request from the church. Perhaps the church had contracted
with Marshall, but then had consulted Munro just to make sure that it had
not made a mistake. If the church sought Munro's advice after explaining
that the contract had already been offered and accepted, then Munro
would have known of the existing contract and would not merely -have
been advising the church about the advisability of offering Marshall a
contract. Prior existence of the contract notwithstanding, Munro had a
conditional privilege to advise the church about Marshall.129 However,
that privilege would be waived if Munro knowingly and maliciously
defamed Marshall. 130
The defamation claim was to be analyzed in the following way:
"The court needs to determine only if Munro actually said: 1) Marshall
was divorced; 2) Marshall was dishonest; 3) Marshall had throat surgery
disabling him as a pastor; and 4) Marshall made improper advances to a
127. Id. (citing Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 648 (Alaska 1991)).
128. Id. ("Judge Katz found Munro acted in the course of his duty.").
129. Id. at 429 ("Munro made his remarks while acting in the course of his
duty . . .. [which] provides Munro with a conditional privilege . . . .").
130. See id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 596 cmt. e and 599-
605A (1977) (noting that the "conditional privilege ... is waived if Marshall can
prove that Munro acted with actual malice")); see also Tubra v. Cooke, 225 P.3d
862, 873 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Lewis v. Carson Oil Co., 127 P.3d 1207, 1210
(Or. Ct. App. 2006)) ("The burden then falls on the plaintiff to prove that the
qualified privilege was abused-that is, that the defendant did not believe the
statement to be true or lacked reasonable grounds for believing that it was true, or
that the statement was made for a purpose outside the scope of the privilege.").
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member of the congregation."1 If it could be proven that those
assertions were made, then "the court need only determine if the facts
stated were true and if Munro made the statements with malice (a
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity)."l3 2 The Alaska Supreme Court
explained that the defamation claim could be addressed without the trial
court needing "to determine if Marshall was qualified to be a pastor or
what those qualifications may be."' 3 3
Munro continued to assert at trial that Marshall was divorced,' 34
which seems surprising unless Munro had a copy of a record to that
effect.'35 If Munro had been able to locate a divorce record, then it would
have been surprising that Marshall was still claiming never to have been
divorced. Assuming that Munro had not been able to locate such a
record, his continuing to maintain that Marshall was divorced suggests
that Munro subjectively believed that Marshall had divorced, even if
there was no reasonable basis for such a belief.
Some courts have found Marshall not only unpersuasive but
"internally inconsistent." 36 Presumably, that is because the Marshall
court both recognized that civil courts are constitutionally barred from
131. Marshall, 845 P.2d at 428.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Chad Olsen, In the Twenty-First Century's Marketplace of
Ideas, Will Religious Speech Continue to Be Welcome?: Religious Speech as
Grounds for Defamation, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 497, 524 (2005) (footnote omitted)
("The court held that the plaintiffs claim for defamation was improperly dismissed
because the court did not need to involve itself in religious doctrine to resolve the
plaintiffs defamation claim."); see also Arthur Gross Schaefer & Darren Levine, No
Sanctuary from the Law: Legal Issues Facing Clergy, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 204
(1996) (footnote omitted) ("Clergy can be held personally responsible for their
defamatory comments that injure a person's reputation.").
134. Marshall, 845 P.2d at 428 n.3 ("Munro maintains that Marshall was in
fact divorced.").
135. Cf Brown v. Gallia Cnty. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 96CA3, 1996
WL 689759, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 1996) (footnote omitted) ("[A]n
examination of the records maintained by the state of West Virginia, the Department
of Health and Human Resources, Bureau of Public Health, Vital Registration Office
failed to uncover any record of a divorce between Treva and Gary during the years
1980 to 1994. Moreover, the clerk for the Jackson County Circuit Court in Ripley,
West Virginia, likewise failed to locate any record of a divorce between Treva and
Gary ever having been filed in that county.").
136. Yaggie v. Ind.-Ky. Synod Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 860 F.
Supp. 1194, 1199 (W.D. Ky. 1994).
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delving into the process by which churches decide whether or not to hire
clergy,137 but nonetheless permitted the interference with contract claim
to proceed.13 8
Yet, the Marshall position was not internally inconsistent
depending upon the proper construction of the constitutional limitation
on court examinations of internal church governance processes. In
Marshall, the church had volunteered that Munro's comments had been
the reason that Marshall's contract had been rescinded.139 Accordingly,
the court did not need to undertake its own examination of the church's
internal processes. Further, because Marshall was not suing the church in
any event, permitting this suit to go forward would not implicate the
kinds of concerns that might be raised were the church itself subject to
tort liability for its employment practices.140
That said, the court's confidence that it would be unnecessary to
examine the internal workings of the church may have been misplaced.
Suppose, for example, that a different member of the church had claimed
that the contract was rescinded because members of the church had had
second thoughts about having Marshall as their minister, and that those
second thoughts were not entirely based on Munro's comments. In that
event, the trier of fact would seem to be getting dangerously close to an
examination of church governance, which Hosanna-Tabor precludes.'4'
Even if there was no conflicting testimony regarding why the
church had had a change of heart, permitting liability to be imposed in
this case might raise another difficulty. Those within a church hierarchy
asked their views about a particular individual's suitability as a minister
might be more circumspect if they feared that they were potentially liable
for their comments. However, the court noted that those asked for their
assessment of a particular individual still enjoyed a conditional privilege,
137. Marshall, 845 P.2d at 427 ("[E]mployment disputes within churches are
core ecclesiastical concerns outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.").
138. See id. at 428 ("[T]he claims of defamation and interference with contract
should not have been dismissed by the superior court.").
139. Id. at 425 ("When Marshall presented himself to begin his employment,
he was notified that because of derogatory information received from Munro, the
church would not hire him as Pastor.").
140. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
,, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709 ("Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of
reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees.").
141. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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and their comments would be protected unless they were made recklessly
or with knowledge of their falsity.142
Other cases have also involved misstatements about a minister,
thereby (likely) resulting in his being denied employment. In Dreviow v.
Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod,14 3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit considered whether a Synod could be sued for its
allegedly defamatory statements about a minister, Drevlow, who was an
ordained minister within the Synod. 14 4
One of the services performed by the Synod was to maintain
personal information files on ministers so that churches seeking to hire
pastors would have a resource to help those churches in their decision-
making.145 "Without consulting Drevlow or verifying the accuracy of its
information, the Synod placed a document in [his] file [falsely] stating
that his spouse had previously been married."1 4 6
Drevlow claimed that because churches would not hire someone
if his "personal file show[ed] that his spouse ha[d] been divorced, the
Synod [had] effectively precluded him from being hired. 147 He noted that
notwithstanding his being established in his profession and
notwithstanding that "over three hundred churches were in need of a
pastor," he was unable to secure employment. 148 He further explained
that he received an offer and became a pastor once the false information
was removed from his file. 14 9
In addition to damages for harm to his reputation, Drevlow
sought compensation for his lost income for the period during which
false information had circulated about his spouse. 1o However, the Synod
argued that it would be impossible for him to show lost employment
because that would involve the court's delving into his marketability as a
142. Marshall, 845 P.2d at 428 ("Marshall must also show that the statements
were not privileged or justified.").
143. 991 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1993).
144. Id. at 469.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 470.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 472.
150. Id. at 470 ("He seeks damages for his loss of income during the time that
the Synod circulated the false information about his spouse and for his loss of public
confidence and social intercourse.").
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pastor,15' notwithstanding that he was on the list of "eligible
ministers." 5 2 The court remanded the case, cautioning the district court
that it "must exercise care to ensure that the evidence presented at trial is
of a secular nature."l 53 The Eighth Circuit explained that if the "matter
cannot be resolved without interpreting religious procedures or beliefs,
the district court should reconsider the Synod's motion to dismiss." 54
At least one question would be whether Drevlow would have to
identify the particular church that would have hired him had the false
information not been wrongly included in his file. Because Drevlow
would be barred from examining internal processes of individual
congregations deciding whether to hire a particular minister, it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, to show that he in fact would have been
hired but for that false information. The Eighth Circuit did not address
whether Drevlow would be permitted to argue that he was more likely
than not wrongly precluded from getting a job at one of the three
hundred churches looking for a pastor,'55 and should be compensated by
computing the average salary at those churches that had been looking for
a pastor (assuming that the salary information itself was available).
A different issue was whether Drevlow could recover for
reputational harms. Courts have noted that statements that would not be
defamatory if expressed about a lay individual might nonetheless be
defamatory if expressed about a minister. Further, there would be no
need in a defamation action to examine internal church procedures and
beliefs to determine whether his having been falsely accused of having
married a divorcee was defamatory.157 Thus, it might seem that someone
151. Id. at 471 ("The Synod argues, however, that the First Amendment
precludes Drevlow from proving at trial that this false information kept him from
obtaining employment as a pastor. According to the Synod, any assessment of
Drevlow's claim for loss of income would necessitate a forbidden inquiry into
Drevlow's marketability as a pastor.").
152. Id. at 472.
153. Id.
154. Id
155. Id. at 470.
156. E.g., Murphy v. Harty, 393 P.2d 206, 214 (Or. 1964) (citations omitted)
("It is accepted doctrine, however, that words may be actionable when used with
respect to a clergyman although the same words would not be actionable if used of
others....").
157. See id.
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like Drevlow could recover damages for such a false allegation, even if
he could not recover for the economic damages associated with his never
having been hired during the period such allegations were published.
Yet, courts have sometimes suggested that ministers may be
barred from bringing a defamation action against a Synod.158 For
example, Farley v. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 159 the
plaintiff-minister argued that "resolution of his defamation claim would
implicate no concern expressed in the First Amendment because an
inquiry into the dispute requires no examination of church procedures or
ecclesiastical decisions." 160 The Wisconsin District Court rejected that
contention, 16 although the court did suggest that "factual scenarios might
exist where resolution of a defamation action against a religious
organization would not require the court to undertake an inquiry in
violation of the First Amendment."1 6 2
Numerous courts have recognized the importance of preventing
the state from interfering in the choice of clergy, and there is strong
support in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence suggesting that the First
Amendments bars the state from deterring who will lead a church.
However, courts have interpreted the bar on the state's deciding
ecclesiastical matters much too broadly, greatly exceeding the limitations
imposed by the Constitution.
Consider Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore,163
which involved a claim by Stephen Downs that his having been defamed
158. See Farley v. Wis. Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 821 F. Supp. 1286 (D.
Minn. 1993) (dismissing a defamation claim brought by a minister against Synod on
First Amendment grounds); Yaggie v. Ind.-Ky. Synod Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Am., 860 F. Supp. 1194 (W.D. Ky. 1994) (holding that the First Amendment
precludes a defamation suit by a minister against Synod). By the same token, some
courts have rejected that a defamation action can be brought against other religious
parties. See, e.g., Jackson v. Presbytery of Susquehanna Valley, 686 N.Y.S.2d 273,
274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction in "a
defamation action brought by a Presbyterian Minister against a Presbytery, a church
and four other Presbyterian Ministers").
159. 821 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Minn. 1993).
160. Farley, 821 F. Supp. at 1290.
161. Id. ("The court determines that such an inquiry would implicate the
concerns expressed in the First Amendment. Based on that determination, the court
concludes that it has no jurisdiction over this matter.").
162. Id.
163. 683 A.2d 808 (Md. Ct. Spe. App. 1996).
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caused him to be denied ordination.164 Allegedly, Reverend John
Wielebski "made and published false and defamatory statements
respecting the Plaintiffs honesty, reliability, integrity and morality,
specifically, asserting sexually motivated conduct toward certain staff
members of St. Patrick's Parish in Cumberland, Maryland."l 6 5 Downs
further alleged that "the other defendants repeated and republished 'said
defamatory allegations' with knowledge of their falsity and 'with the
intent to harm the Plaintiffs chances for ordination to the
priesthood."'l
66
The court noted that appellant had not informed the court "of the
exact language-the precise statement-made by any of the
,167
defendants." For example, the court could not tell "what conduct was
alleged or whether, if committed, it would have been unlawful." 68 Yet,
the Maryland Court of Appeals' subsequent analysis made clear that the
court was not focused on whether the conduct of which Downs had been
accused violated the law. Instead, the court noted that it "is apparent
from these allegations, and the inferences that must necessarily be drawn
from them, that the very heart of the action is a decision by appellant's
clerical supervisors to prevent him from becoming a priest."' 69 Because
the defamatory statements "evidenc[ed] a determination on their part-
whether valid and fair or invalid and unfair-that appellant was not a
suitable candidate for the priesthood,"o7 0 the court believed the
statements were protected. "That the offensive conduct was so directed is
what brings this case squarely within the protective ambit of the First
Amendment." But this suggests that the speech was protected
regardless of whether or not the alleged actions were criminal. This is an
amazingly broad conferral of immunity because it suggests that as long
as the aim is to speak about the individual's alleged qualifications to be a
member of the ministry, the comments will be immune from tort
164. Id. at 810.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id.
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damages- even if the charges are known to be false and made
maliciously.
The Downs court suggested that "the allegedly defamatory
statements were made in the context of a conclusion by the Church
hierarchy that appellant was not suitable to be a priest." 7 2 The court did
not discuss whether anyone outside of the Church hierarchy heard the
statements, although the plaintiff had asserted that he had "learned from
an individual who wishe[d] to remain anonymous that the defendant"
Reverend Wielebski had made defamatory comments about him. 17 3
Presumably, it was that same unnamed informant who had reported that
the other defendants had "repeated and republished"1 74 those defamatory
statements with knowledge of their falsity. But if the individual reporting
the conversations was not a member of the church hierarchy, then the
statements about Downs might have lost their immunity- even if they in
fact were about his suitability as a priest.
By the same token, the court did not discuss whether the
allegedly defamatory comments were only made in the context of
discussions about whether Downs should be ordained or, instead, were
made in a variety of contexts. Allegedly, there were several meetings
during which these comments were stated or repeated. 175 But stating or
repeating defamatory comments outside of the context of a discussion
about Down's suitability for ordination would be the basis for damages
rather than for immunity.
Consider Ogugua v. Archdiocese of Omaha,76 which involved,
inter alia, a defamation claim after an email was allegedly sent to the
parishioners at the Saint Vincent De Paul Church stating that the plaintiff
has been "reassigned to another church due to 'serious concerns . . .
[resulting from] meetings with Father Kampschneider and Father Bart
throughout the past year."i Citing Dreviow and distinguishing
172. Id.
173. Id. at 810.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. No. 8:07CV471, 2008 WL 818935 (D. Neb. Mar. 24, 2008).
177. Id. at * 1.
178. Id. at *5 (citing Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 991 F.2d
468 (8th Cir. 1993)).
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Downs, 179 the district court noted that the allegedly defamatory
statements made in this case were not only made in an appointment or
retention process within the church.s Rather, in refusing to dismiss the
case, 1 the Ogugua court suggested that it would revisit the First
Amendment concerns if it turned out that the allegations of defamation
could not be assessed without becoming entangled in matters involving
religious doctrine or practice.182
In Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington, a
former pastor of a church sued certain senior members of the
congregation for defamation. Cha and various church members believed
that "an independent auditor should be retained to review the financial
records of the church, the Sejong Korean School, and the Washington
Theological Seminary,"' 8 4 at least in part, because some of the
congregants "suspected 'that certain Church members and Church
leaders had participated in financial impropriety with regard to funds
belonging to the Church, the Sejong Korean School and the [Washington
Theological Seminary]." Cha testified that he was later informed that
"his future employment at the Church was in jeopardy if he did not cease
his advocacy of full disclosure of the Church's financial records."' 8 6 A
few months later, during a meeting of the church's deacons, Cha was
accused of having borrowed more than $100,000 from the Church
without repaying the loan, although there apparently was no proof to
back up such an allegation.
179. Id. at *4 (citing Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 683
A.2d 808 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996)).
180. See id. at *4-5 ("As Ogugua notes, however, [Downs] involved
defamation claims based on the defendants' statements questioning the plaintiffs'
fitness to serve as members of the clergy. The courts concluded that judicial inquiry
into the selection or retention process for clergy would be impermissible under the
First Amendment.").
181. Id. at *4 ("At this stage of the proceedings, Ogugua has met his burden of
demonstrating that jurisdiction is proper.").
182. Id. at *5 ("If further proceedings reveal that this matter cannot be
resolved without interpreting religious procedures or beliefs, this Court will entertain
the appropriate motion at such time.").
183. 553 S.E.2d 511 (Va. 2001).
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The court understood that the allegation, if untrue, would be
defamatory because defamatory words are actionable if they "impute to a
person unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of
profit, or want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such an office
or employment" or if they "prejudice such person in his or her
profession or trade." 89 However, the court believed that "the plaintiffs
allegations of defamation against the individual defendants cannot be
considered in isolation, separate and apart from the church's decision to
terminate his employment."1 90 Here, too, "[t]he individual defendants
who purportedly uttered defamatory remarks about the plaintiff were
church officials who attended meetings of the church's governing bodies
that had been convened for the purpose of discussing certain accusations
against the plaintiff."'91 However, the court noted that if a civil court
were to exercise jurisdiction over such a case, "the court would be
compelled to consider the church's doctrine and beliefs because such
matters would undoubtedly affect the plaintiffs fitness to perform
pastoral duties and whether the plaintiff had been prejudiced in his
profession."l92 But it is not clear why that is so. If there were damages
even excluding the lost income due to Cha's having been fired, then
there would have been no need to examine church doctrine and beliefs to
see whether the firing was justified. 193
While the Cha court noted that those making the comments
belonged to the church hierarchy,1 94 the court's justification would
immunize defamatory statements related to a pastor's fitness to serve-
even if the individuals making the comments were not members of the
church hierarchy. But even discussions about public officials in the
performance of their official duties can be the basis for defamation
188. Id at 516 (citing Perk v. Vector Res. Grp. Ltd., 485 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Va.
1997)).




193. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (discussing the
defamation damages that might be awarded to a minister excluding the lost income
resulting from the minister having been fired).
194. Id. at 513 ("During a meeting of the church's deacons ... defendant Do
Sik Ko [made allegedly defamatory remarks] 'to the [p]laintiff and the entire
meeting of Deacons."').
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damages under some circumstances,19 5 and it is not at all clear that the
Constitution imposes a tougher standard for ministers.
In Duncan v. Peterson,196 a minister, Richard Duncan, sued
Erwin Lutzer, the senior pastor at Duncan's former church for false light
invasion of privacy.19 7 Peterson had sent a bundle of letters to board
members at Hope Church, a church that Duncan founded.198 Duncan was
accused, inter alia, of having an improper relationship with a divorced
single woman and misusing alcohol.' 99 Duncan's wife had filed for
200divorce, and his children's guardian ad litem had shown him a copy of




The Moody Church ordained Duncan, and decided to rescind
its licensing and ordination based on the charges that had been made
203
against Duncan. The defendant had argued that the First Amendment
"precludes the judiciary from involving itself in matters within the
church, including the Moody Church's decision to revoke plaintiffs
ordination and its conduct of disseminating the letters regarding the
revocation of plaintiffs ordination." 204 However, the court reasoned that
the First Amendment "provides that civil courts may not determine the
correctness of interpretations of canonical text or some decisions relating
195. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.").
196. 947 N.E.2d 305 (1ll. App. Ct. 2011).
197. See id. at 309.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 310.
200. Id. at 309.
201. See id. at 311 ("Before plaintiff received his own copy of the ... letter,
his children's guardian ad litem showed him a copy of the letter at a dissolution
proceeding.").
202. Id. at 309 ("In 1989, plaintiff was ordained as a minister by the Moody
Church.").
203. Id. at 310.
204. Id. at 311-12.
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to government of the religious polity; rather, courts must accept as given
whatever the religious entity decides."20 5
At issue here, however, was "whether defendant invaded
plaintiffs privacy by placing him in a false light when defendant
disseminated to individuals who were not members of the Moody Church
a bundle of letters regarding plaintiffs conduct."2 06 Because the
allegations were made to individuals who were not part of the Church,
"the letters were not transmitted only within the Moody Church, [and]
the subject matter of the dispute does not concern matters internal to the
,,207
Moody Church.' Arguably, interchurch communications might be
protected depending upon the relationship between the churches. Here,
however, because "the Moody Church has no authority over Hope
Church . . . the dissemination of the letters at issue was not an internal
procedure of the Moody Church."208
A different question was raised, namely, whether the opinions
articulated in the documents were themselves religious opinion and thus
209
protected. However, the court reasoned that the allegations were stated
as fact and not as opinion.210 Further, even if it might have been believed
that there was a conditional privilege to report these allegations, the jury
had found below that these allegations were made with knowledge of
their falsity or with a reckless disregard for their truth.211 The Duncan
court recognized that false statements made with actual malice might be
actionable even if they spoke to a minister's qualifications to serve.212
205. Id. at 312 (citing Serbian East. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. &
Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)).
206. Id. at 313.
207. Id
208. Id. at 314.
209. Id. ("[D]efendant asserts that, because the contents of the letter are
religious opinions and cannot be proved false, no false-light-invasion-of-privacy
claim can be sustained, no matter how derogatory the contents of the letters might
be.").
210. Id. at 314-15 ("The April 23, 2000, letter stated all accusations contained
within it as fact, not as opinion.").
211. Id. at 316 ("[T]he jury found that, when the letters were sent, defendant
knew that they contained false statements or he acted in reckless disregard for
whether any statements were false.").
212. See id at 314, 319 (affirming trial court damage award to minister who
claimed false light invasion of privacy, where the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine
was found not to apply).
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Among the issues in Bilbrey v. MyerS213 was a claim by Darrel
214
Bilbrey that he had been defamed by David Myers, his pastor. Bilbrey
and Myers had a business and personal relationship outside the church. 2 15
216
Myers sponsored Bilbrey to become a minister. At one point, Bilbrey
confided to Myers that as a teenager he had been called a faggot by an
217
authority figure. On a different occasion, Myers asked Bilbrey if he
was gay.218 Bilbrey responded in the negative.2 19 The relationship
between the two men later deteriorated.220
On several occasions, Myers told members of the church that
221 22
Bilbrey was gay, including the father of Bilbrey's fianc6e.222 Myers
223
suggested that Bilbrey call off his marriage and move out of state.
Bilbrey did the latter, attempting to transfer his pastor's license from
224
Florida to Michigan. After Bilbrey had moved, Myers told Bilbrey's
new pastor that Bilbrey was gay.225 The court explained that although
some courts "refuse to adjudicate most tort claims against religious
institutions, finding such claims barred because the conduct giving rise to
the claim is inextricably entangled with church polity and
administration,"226 many courts:
have adopted a narrower view of the doctrine and
hold that the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment are not violated if the tort claims can
be resolved through the application of 'neutral
principles' of tort law, particularly where there is
213. 91 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).












226. Id at 891 (citing Ind. Area Found. of the United Methodist Church, Inc.
v. Snyder, 953 N.E.2d 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).
357DEFAMATION AND THE CHURCH2013]
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
no allegation that the conduct in question was part
227of a sincerely held religious belief or practice.
The court went on to explain that the "First Amendment does not
grant Myers . . . carte blanche to defame church members and ex-
members." 2 28 The court suggested that "the statement that a person is a
homosexual [is] potentially defamatory outside the context of any
religious doctrine or practice," 22 9 and held that Bilbey's defamation "can
be adjudicated without implicating the First Amendment and was
improperly dismissed on the basis of the church autonomy doctrine."23 0
Bracketing whether allegations of an individual's having a same-
231
sex orientation are defamatory, one of the points made by the Bilbey
court was that the clergy should not be thought immune from suit for
their defamatory comments about current or former church members.
Here, the court was following the reasoning of a different Florida
appellate court. In House of God Which Is the Church of the Living God,
232
the Pillar and Ground of the Truth Without Controversy, Inc. v. White,
a parishioner, Ashanta White, sued her church and pastor after her pastor,
Semmie Taylor, "called her a 'slut' while standing at the church altar in
front of other clergy and parishioners." 2 33 The appellate court dismissed
234the action against the church but not against the pastor.
The courts seem to have adopted the following approach even
with respect to knowingly false allegations involving the clergy. If those
statements were not made within the church, then liability may be
imposed if a conditional privilege can be defeated because the false
statements were made with actual malice. However, if those statements
were made within the context of internal church deliberations about
whether to hire or retain a minister, civil courts are precluded from
227. Id. (citing Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 358 (Fla. 2002)).
228. Id. at 892.
229. Id.
230. Id. (citing House of God Which is the Church of the Living God, the
Pillar and Ground of the Truth Without Controversy, Inc. v. White, 792 So. 2d 491,
495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
231. See Davis v. Fred's Appliance, Inc., 287 P.3d 51, 61 (Wash. Ct. App.
2012) ("[I]mputation of homosexuality is not defamatory per se.").
232. 792 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
233. Id. at 492.
234. Id. at 495.
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entering the fray, even assuming that the comments at issue involved
purely secular matters and were intentional fabrications.
Civil courts must defer with respect to interpretation of religious
matters. However, according immunity to false and malicious comments
that might speak to a pastor's suitability is neither constitutionally
mandated nor good public policy. While it is fair to suggest that
discussion as a general matter should not be chilled when matters
concerning the appointment of spiritual leaders is at issue, malicious
falsehoods should not protected.
A separate issue involves damages. In almost all cases, it will be
too difficult to tell whether even defamatory comments were the cause of
a minister not being hired or rehired. But that difficulty goes to whether
economic damages can be assessed rather than to whether a particular
cause of action is justiciable. A minister can be harmed by defamatory
comments even bracketing his loss of employment, just as a parishioner
can be harmed by defamatory comments. Indeed, in considering what
kinds of damages might be awarded to a defamed minister, it may be
helpful to consider the approaches taken in cases involving allegations by
parishioners of defamation or publication of private facts.
B. Suits by Current and Former Congregants
In several cases, current or former parishioners have sued for
defamation or for publication of private facts. In the defamation cases,
the courts have considered whether the allegedly false information was
expressed for a religious purpose or was too closely aligned with church
governance. In the publication of private facts cases, the courts take a
number of approaches, including an actual or implied consent model,
where the parishioner is assumed to have consented to public humiliation
as an appropriate punishment for wrongdoing. At other times, the courts
focus on whether the expressions were made for a religious purpose, and
then try to balance the burdens on religious exercise with the harms to
the individual. While some courts have struck a reasonable balance
weighing the competing interests, other courts have afforded overbroad
immunity to statements that simply should not be immunized.
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1. Defamation of Current or Past Congregants
The cases involving defamation of congregants have involved a
variety of scenarios and have not yielded a clear approach. Courts may
focus on the breadth of the audience, the context in which the charge was
uttered, and the degree to which the allegation requires an interpretation
of religious doctrine. However, because courts differ so much about
which factors are important and how much weight the factors should be
given, the current jurisprudence cannot consistently protect anyone's
interests.
In Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles,235 the
California Supreme Court discussed the merits of a defamation action
236brought by two former members of the congregation. Charges had
been leveled in front of the congregation that Reverend A. L. Brewer and
Mr. Eugene Fisher were "willing to lie in order to injure their church," 23 7
and each was accused of being "associated with one who, 'under the role
of a minister of Jesus, is one of Satan's choicest tools."' 2 3 8 The court
noted that "[tlhe charges were designed to injure plaintiffs' reputations in
the church and to cause them to be shunned and avoided [and that the] . .
language was aptly chosen for this purpose."23 9
The jury found that the charges were false, a finding upheld on
appeal.240 The California Supreme Court noted that "[o]rdinarily, the
common interest of the members of a church in church matters is
sufficient to give rise to a qualified privilege to communications between
members on subjects relating to the church's interest." 24 1 However, that
conditional privilege is defeated if it can be established that the false
charges were maliciously motivated or had no reasonable basis in fact.242
235. 197 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
236. Id at 715.
237. Id. at 717.
238. Id
239. Id
240. Id ("The evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury's concluding that the
charges were false.").
241. Id (citing Slocinski v. Radwan, 144 A. 787 (N.H. 1929)).
242. Id at 718 ("The question then is whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the implied finding of the jury that defendants were motivated by a
malicious or other improper motive or published their charges without reasonable
grounds for believing them.").
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The court upheld the verdicts against Reverend J. Raymond Henderson,
the pastor of the church, and John Hilton and R. A. Hudson, the
chairman and secretary of the board of deacons respectively. 243
In Brewer, the membership had "voted to withdraw 'the hand of
fellowship' from plaintiffs and expel them from the church" 244 after the
charges had been read, which means that the defamatory statements had
been made while the individuals were still members of the church.
Brewer suggests that defamatory comments made about current church
members are not immunized from review, although one of the issues
dividing courts has been whether the timing of the alleged defamatory
publication might immunize a religious speaker from suit.245
In Schoenhals v. Mains,246 a couple sued a pastor and church for
247
defamation. In August 1988, Larry Schoenhals "executed a guaranty to
[a bank] for the payment of . . . certain church debts, liabilities, and
obligations of the Church." 2 4 8 A little over a year later, he was "notified
that the church had been late in making several payments."2 49 At that
point, the couple discontinued their contact with the church and retained
an attorney, although they never informed the church of their intent to
end their membership.250 The Schoenhals' attorney sent a letter to the
243. See id at 715.
244. Id.
245. Compare Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of New York,
Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Providing the Church with a defense to tort
is particularly appropriate here because Paul is a former Church member. Courts
generally do not scrutinize closely the relationship among members (or former
members) of a church. Churches are afforded great latitude when they impose
discipline on members or former members.") with Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978,
987-88 (Okla. 1992) ("Parishioners admit that at no time during or after the
proceedings at issue did they withdraw their Church membership. Thus the Church
retained full subject matter and personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the two
disciplinary cases against the parishioners. Upon excommunication, and while a
parishioner remains under the church discipline, the ecclesiastical tribunal impliedly
relinquishes the power of judicature over the parishioner for any other or future
conduct, yet retains cognizance over the previously adjudicated matter for the
purpose of implementing any extant ecclesiastical sanction." (emphasis added)).
246. 504 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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pastor of the church, Ronald Mains, asking that the Schoenhals be
released from their guaranty.251
A month and a half after receipt of the letter requesting release,
the pastor read a letter to the congregation in which he set out the
following reasons for the termination of their memberships:
1. A lack of financial stewardship with consistency and faithful
tithing and offering over a given period of time.
2. A desire on your part to consistently create division, animosity
and strife in the fellowship.
3. Direct fabrication of lies with the intent to hurt the reputation
and the establishment of Faith Tabernacle of Truth Church and
congregation.
4. Backbiting, railing accusations, division, lying, are some of
the most serious sins found in the Bible. Where, by all
appearances and related conversations, you have fallen into all
252of the categones.
The court noted that "[w]hile Mains' statement that the
Schoenhals had engaged in '[d]irect fabrication of lies with the intent to
hurt the reputation and the establishment' of the Church appears
unrelated to church doctrine on its face, the statement nevertheless
relates to the Church's reasons and motives for terminating the
Schoenhals' membership."253 Because "the Schoenhals' claim clearly
involves an internal conflict within the Church,"254 the court's delving
into such matters for purposes of determining whether defamation
damages should be awarded was "precluded by the First Amendment." 25 5
Schoenhals affords robust immunity to religious organizations.
At issue here was not the "freedom of a religious organization to select
its ministers" 256 or "a religious group's right to shape its own faith and
mission through its appointments."257 Nor did it involve "extensive
251. Id.
252. Id. at 234.
253. Id. at 236.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
, , 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012).
257. Id. at 706.
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inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity." 25 8 Instead, at issue
were allegedly defamatory statements about a founding member of a
church. If immunity is afforded whenever there is an internal division
about anything related to the church, then leaders of religious
organizations have been afforded broad immunity to defame congregants
who challenge their administration. Certainly, Brewer would have been
decided differently had California followed the rule suggested by the
Schoenhals court.259
In First United Church, Inc. v. Udofia,260 two former members of
a church and four non-members brought suit against several church
261
members for defamation. At a New Year's Eve church service, the
defendants allegedly "intentionally and maliciously announced, or
instigated an announcement, to the congregation that each of the
plaintiffs 'was a witch and had practiced evil deeds upon family and
fellow Church members."' 2 62 The evil deeds were alleged to include
"practicing witchcraft, acts of bodily harm, thievery, causing infertility,
stealing United States government files to harm a fellow member, and
child abuse." 26 3 The Georgia appellate court reasoned that the trial court
had jurisdiction to hear this case because the plaintiffs "sought a civil
remedy for a civil wrong, the violation of their civil right not to be
publicly slandered, and this required no entanglement with the internal
affairs of a religious organization."264 However, the trial court could only
consider the harm caused by certain allegedly defamatory statements-
child abuse, thievery, inflicting bodily harm, and stealing government
265
documents-because those violated Georgia law. A false accusation of
lawbreaking constitutes slander266 and would not be protected.267 The
258. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976).
259. See supra notes 235-45 and accompanying text.
260. 479 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
261. Id. at 148.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 149.
265. See id. ("Child abuse, inflicting bodily harm, thievery, and stealing
government files constitute crimes under the law of Georgia.").
266. See id. ("To falsely accuse one of committing a crime constitutes the tort
of slander." (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-4(a)(2) (West 2013))).
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appellate court explained that, "as to all charges against plaintiffs except
that they were witches and practiced witchcraft, the complaint stated a
cause of action which the court was competent to adjudicate."26 8
However, because the witchcraft charges "related to religious faith,
belief, and practice,"26 9 they could not be considered by the civil courts.
The Udofia court did not expressly discuss one of the
ramifications of its decision; namely, that the plaintiffs' remedy would
be severely limited. The plaintiffs had argued "the accusations have
subjected them to ridicule, contempt, and ostracism among the Nigerian
community in Atlanta and in their home states in Nigeria, resulting in
some instances in substantial business losses." 2 70 But the court's ruling
meant that the very accusations causing the damage could not be the
basis for recovery.
The Georgia appellate court noted that the plaintiffs considered
the "statements that they are witches and practice witchcraft" to be
"civilly slanderous." 27 1 However, because truth is a defense, the Georgia
court explained that to "try the truth of such charges would harken back
to the early days of this nation's life, when the treachery of witchcraft
trials blackened judicial dockets."27 2 Rather than permit the truth of a
witchcraft charge to be adjudicated, the court reasoned that it would be
better to make such a charge immune from suit.273
The trial court had "rejected the challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction,"274 reasoning that "the statements ... [were] not strictly an
ecclesiastical matter." 2 75 However, the appellate court offered the
following direction to the trial court: "To the extent that damages were
bottomed on slander for charging plaintiffs with being witches and
practicing witchcraft, it was error. To the extent that damages were
founded on charges of crime, it was not error."276
267. See id. ("[Slander] is not protected by the doctrine of separation of church
and state by utterance as testimony during the course of a church service.").
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 148.
271. Id. at 149.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 149.
274. Id. at 150.
275. Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
276. Id.
Suppose, however, that the plaintiffs had been accused of
committing crimes through the use of witchcraft. While the appellate
court did not say expressly what the trial court should do in that event,
the very possibility that such an allegation would require a trial on the
merits would likely force the court to deny subject matter jurisdiction.277
Udofia is helpfully contrasted with Brewer.278 Had the California
Supreme Court employed the Udofia analysis, it would presumably have
denied recovery because being in league with Satan would have religious
overtones and would hearken back to regrettable trials of earlier days.
There is an additional difficulty posed in Udofia, which is
highlighted by comparing Schoenhals and Udofia. The Schoenhals court
precluded recovery because "an internal conflict within the Church" 279
was at issue. But Udofia involved either former members of the church
or individuals who had never been members of the church, and they were
unable to recover for the most serious reputational harms that they
suffered, notwithstanding their lack of an existing connection to the
church where they were defamed.
At issue in Kleibenstein v. Iowa Conference of the United
Methodist Church280 were allegedly defamatory comments made about
parishioner Jane Kleibenstein by United Methodist Church district
281
superintendent Jerrold Swinton (who was also an ordained minister).
Swinton had attended church services at Shell Rock United Methodist
282
Church after hearing reports of strife within the congregation. Swinton
then wrote a letter that was mailed to members of the congregation as
283
well as to other people living in the Shell Rock community.
In that letter, Swinton said that he "was in despair when Jane
Kliebenstein made an effort to whisper scornfully to me that this pastor
must leave Shell Rock." 28 4 He continued, "When will you stop the
blaming, negative and unhappy persons among you from tearing down
277. Id. at 149 (suggesting that the court would not have subject matter
jurisdiction over a trial involving an allegation of the practice of witchcraft).
278. 197 P. 2d 713 (Cal. 1948) (en banc).
279. Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
280. 663 N.W.2d 404 (Iowa 2003).
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the spirit of Jesus Christ among you? . . . You know whether a person
has the spirit of Jesus or Satan by their fruits." 28 5 Finally, he suggested
that "[w]hen the congregation of Shell Rock is ready to acknowledge
they allowed the spirit of Satan to work in their midst, express some
contrition and seek help-then help will come."286
Kleibenstein sued, claiming that "the letter falsely attacked [her]
'integrity and moral character,' causing damage to her reputation in the
community."287 While the defendants conceded that "Swinton's
statement about the 'spirit of Satan' referred to Jane Kliebenstein,"288
they argued that "the phrase is a 'purely ecclesiastical term, deriving its
meaning from religious dogma' thereby preventing the court from
adjudicating its impact in the context of a civil suit for defamation." 2 8 9
The Iowa Supreme Court noted that the defamation claim would
have been dismissed "had the matter been divulged solely to the
members of Shell Rock UMC," 2 90 explaining that "communications
between members of a religious organization concerning the conduct of
other members or officers in their capacity as such are qualifiedly
privileged."291 Here, the Iowa court suggests that comments made within
the religious organization about officers have a qualified privilege. Such
comments might be actionable if false and made with actual malice,
although the court implied that the qualified privilege would likely not
have been lost in this case.
Swinton's comments were not protected by a qualified privilege
because they were so widely disseminated. The "fact that Swinton's
communication about Jane was published outside the congregation
weakens this ecclesiastical shield" 292 for two distinct reasons. First,
otherwise privileged communications might lose that status "upon proof
of excess publication or publication 'beyond the group interest."'293
Second, the court reasoned that "if publication solely to church members
285. Id
286. Id
287. Id. at 405-06.
288. Id at 406.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 407 (citing Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 340, at 633 (1995)).
292. Id.
293. Id. (citing Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles, 197 P.2d
713, 717 (Cal. 1948) (en banc)).
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justifies ecclesiastical status for otherwise defamatory communications,
proof of publication to non-church members arguably supports the
,294
opposite conclusion.
If it were true that the term "spirit of Satan" could only be
understood in theological terms, then it presumably would not matter
whether non-members of the congregation were apprised of the charge
because, as defendants argued, "in order to determine whether the term
'spirit of Satan' is defamatory--or truthful-as applied to Kliebenstein, a
factfinder would necessarily be required to study and interpret church
theology and beliefs concerning Satan."295 The Iowa Supreme Court
disagreed because such a term "carries a common, and largely
unflattering, secular meaning."296
Courts thus examine a number of factors when analyzing
whether a religious leader's defamatory comments are actionable. The
courts will consider whether the allegedly defamed individual had a
connection to the religious institution about which the allegations were
made, and whether the statements had a secular meaning. However, the
courts do not weigh these considerations in the same way, which means
that defamatory statements about a current or former member of a church
might be actionable in one jurisdiction but not in another.
297
Bowie v. Murphy makes interpreting the relevant jurisprudence
even more confusing. The issues are complicated because they involved
an angry division within a church about internal governance. James
Murphy, Jr. was a pastor at Greater Little Zion Baptist Church.298 There
was some divisiveness under his leadership, and eventually a vote was
299
scheduled to determine whether he would be retained. Thornton, a
Murphy supporter, attended the meeting during which the vote was to
occur. Her intention was to "disrupt, intimidate, harass, and coerce
congregation members who were trying to vote."300 David Bowie was a
294. Id (citing Schoenhals v. Mains, 504 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993)).
295. Id
296. Id at 407.
297. 624 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2006).
298. Id. at 76.
299. Id
300. Id
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deacon of the Church,301 who "had been assigned to provide security to
the voting area." 30 2 Bowie saw Thornton, who had been "carrying a large
camera in her right hand [and who had forcefully opened] the door to the
voting area," 3 03 standing there "taking pictures and writing down the
names of poll workers, voters, and staffers. 304 Bowie went up to
Thornton to ask her what she was doing, although Thornton had
apparently not heard him because of all of the noise.3 05 He then "gently
touched the right shoulder of Thornton in order to gain her attention and
again called her by name." 3 06 Thornton "looked back over her right
shoulder, realized it was Bowie, ... cursed him, [and] .. . then attempted
to strike Bowie with the camera she held in her right hand." 3 07 Bowie
grabbed her wrist to defend himself.30 Once he released her wrist and
"verbally tried to calm her," 309 she "put the camera in her left hand and
struck Bowie in the chest with her right hand.,
3 10
At this point, Bowie called the police who, upon their arrival,
took statements from various people.3 11 Allegedly, "Thornton 'willfully,
falsely, and with malice' told police and Church members, including
Murphy, that Bowie had assaulted her."3 12 In addition, it was alleged that
she "solicited others who were not witnesses to the incident to provide
false information and statements to the Fairfax County police."3 13
A little over a week later, Murphy called a church meeting while
Bowie was on vacation. 3 14 At the meeting, Murphy told the congregation













313. Id. at 76-77.
314. See id at 76-77 (The vote occurred on June 21, and the meeting was
called on July 1).
315. Id. at 77.
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316
accusation in a letter to the congregation. Murphy then "called for a
motion to have Bowie dismissed as a deacon and to have Bowie's church
membership demoted from 'full' status to 'watch care.' 3 1 1 Such a
motion was indeed made and seconded based on Murphy's accusation of
assault.318 Bowie sued for defamation, claiming that the assault
accusations against him "were made with knowledge of the falsity of the
allegation or reckless disregard for the truth."319
One of the issues before the Virginia Supreme Court was
whether Bowie's claim was barred by the court's decision in Cha v.
Korean Presbyterian Church of Washington.32 0 The court reaffirmed that
defamation claims cannot be addressed if doing so "would necessarily
involve issues of church governance."321 The court explained that in Cha,
"the plaintiffs defamation claims were so connected to his wrongful
termination claim as to mix with 'ecclesiastical decisions regarding the
appointment and removal' of church officials." 3 22 In contrast, "Bowie's
defamation claims arise solely from allegations made by the defendants
that Bowie perpetrated an assault." 32 3 The Virginia Supreme Court
reasoned that the "circuit court can evaluate these statements for their
veracity and the impact they had on Bowie's reputation the same as if the
statements were made in any other, non-religious context." 32 4
But if this were the test, then many of the statements that have
been held non-defamatory because made in a religious setting should be
held a potential basis of liability. The court understood that "some of the
allegedly defamatory statements were made at a church meeting in which
Bowie's status as deacon was the primary issue." 3 25 However, the court
316. Id
317. Id
318. Id. ("Vivian Pace made the motion based on Bowie's 'alleged assault' of
Thornton. Laiuanna Russell seconded the motion 'on the same basis."').
319. Id
320. Id. at 78 ("We granted Bowie this appeal limited to the issues whether the
circuit court erred in its October 21, 2004 ruling that Bowie's defamation claims are
barred by our decision in Cha."). For a discussion of Cha, see supra notes 183-95
and accompanying text.
321. Id
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reasoned that "Bowie pled his defamation claims in such a manner that
the circuit court, unlike the trial court in Cha, can consider them in
isolation, separate and apart from the church governance issue involved
in Bowie's status as a deacon." 32 6 Basically, the Virginia Supreme Court
reasoned that the defamation issue could be addressed "because the
claims can be decided without addressing issues of faith and doctrine,
[i.e.,] ... the circuit court need not become involved with the underlying
dispute among the congregation of the church regarding Murphy as
pastor."327
The Virginia Supreme Court's point that the claims could be
addressed without considering matters of faith and doctrine was
accurate.328 However, that was also true in Cha, where the pastor was
accused of having received a loan and then not having paid the money
329
back. Indeed, in many of these cases, although the defamatory
statements were made during a service or during a meeting in which
church matters were being discussed, the statements themselves could be
330assessed without intruding on religious matters.
The Virginia Supreme Court noted that "some of the allegedly
defamatory statements were made at a church meeting in which Bowie's
status as deacon was the primary issue."33 1 It might be thought, then, that
the reason that this cause of action could proceed was that some of the
comments were not made at the meeting. Yet, this does not provide a
plausible explanation of the court's holding. As Justice Agee points out
in his concurring and dissenting opinion, the defamation actions against
Pace and Russell were based on their actions during the meeting at which
Bowie's continuing as deacon was the primary issue.332 But such a
meeting was focused on church governance, so the court clearly was not
326. Id.
327. Id. at 80.
328. See supra note 162.
329. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., supra notes 213-231 (discussing sexual orientation allegations),
232-234 (discussing promiscuity allegations).
331. Bowie, 624 S.E.2d at 79 (emphasis added).
332. Id. at 81 (Agee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Bowie
identifies the act of defamation, as to both women [Pace and Russell], to be their
'recommendations' regarding his office as Deacon and change in his church
membership status 'in a reckless disregard for the truth."').
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accepting that internal church governance procedures were immune from
review if the statements at issue were of a purely secular nature.
2. Publication of Private Facts
Sometimes, the cause of action against the church official
involves a breach of a promise not to reveal the information publicly. In
these cases, a number of factors are discussed including whether the
plaintiff had impliedly consented to the publication, and whether the
plaintiff was a member of the congregation at the time of the publication.
Jurisdictions vary with respect to the immunity that they are willing to
confer for breaches of confidentiality by religious leaders, and some
jurisdictions offer such robust immunity that parishioners would be
aghast if they knew the degree to which their most private secrets could
be communicated to the world with impunity, good public policy to the
contrary notwithstanding. 333
Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church334 involved the public
dissemination of private information to a congregation, despite a church
official's promise not to do so.335 Charles Roberson, a bishop, and
Claudia Snyder were both members of the same church, the Santa Cruz
336Dioceses of the Evangelical Orthodox Church. They had an
extramarital affair, and both confessed to Warren Hardenbrook,3  who
was the Diocesan Bishop for the Santa Cruz Dioceses.338 After informing
the congregation of the affair, Hardenbrook excommunicated
Roberson.339 Snyder then sought counseling from Nixon, a marriage
333. See Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)
("Public policy supports an action for breach of confidentiality by a minister. There
is a public policy in favor of encouraging a person to seek religious counseling.
People expect their disclosures to clergy members to be kept confidential.").
334. 216 Cal. App. 3d 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
335. Id. at 302 ("Despite promises of confidentiality, Snyder alleges Nixon
divulged information from this meeting to the church Board of Elders and to the
other respondents. The church then communicated this information to all church
members.").
336. See id. at 301.
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counselor.340 Allegedly, Nixon then revealed the contents of their
conversations to the church elders, who revealed this information to the
.341congregation.
The Snyder court set out the test that should have been used to
determine whether the public revelation of private confidences was
actionable: "A court must first ask two preliminary questions: Is this a
religion, and does the course of conduct alleged qualify as a religious
expression?" 342 That a religion was involved was not in dispute. 34 3
However, it was unclear whether the course of conduct at issue
(revelation of confidential information) itself qualified as religious
expression.344 The court explained that it simply could not tell from the
record whether religious doctrine required that confessions be revealed
345under certain circumstances and, if so, what those circumstances were.
Even if it could be shown that the revelation of private
confidences was required or, at least, that there was a "religious purpose
for the disclosure of appellants' confidential communications," 34 6 that
would not end the matter. A separate question was whether "the interests
that are invaded by respondents' religious practices are of sufficiently
significant interest to the state to warrant the application of tort
liability." 347 The court explained that a tort claim will "survive a motion
to dismiss if the state's interests are significant, and no less restrictive
burden than the possibility of eventual tort liability is available." 34 8
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 306 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 56-57 (Cal.
1988)).
343. See id. at 307.
344. Id. ("It does not appear from the record, however, that the second
preliminary question-whether respondents' course of conduct qualified as a
religious expression-was ever asked.").
345. Id. (explaining that there was nothing in the record speaking to "whether
it is a canon of respondents' belief that confessions (penitential or not) are revealed
to the congregation unless the offender repents; whether it is church practice for the
substance of a confession to be shared among church officials; or whether it is
consistent with church doctrine to reveal the substance of a confession to anyone
outside the church, and if so, under what circumstances").
346. Id. at 310.
347. Id. at 308.
348. Id. at 310 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988)).
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The Snyder court held that "on a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, it is insufficient for respondents to no more than generally
allege, as a substantive defense to tort liability, that their conduct was
religious in nature." 34 9 Here, the court was trying to walk a tightrope. On
one hand, it was "mindful that civil courts must abstain from resolving
disputes which turn on extensive inquiry into 'religious law and
polity."' 350 On the other hand, it rejected the notion that a policy of
"strict deference" 3 5 was appropriate.
Yet, it is somewhat difficult to tell what the court wanted or
needed to know. Would it matter whether doctrine permitted, rather than
required, privileged information to be divulged if the parishioner was
unrepentant? Suppose that there was conflicting testimony about whether
doctrine required, permitted, or prohibited such a revelation. This is
exactly the kind of dispute that the court should refrain from deciding.
An additional difficulty in this case was that there were two
breaches of confidentiality alleged in this case, one by Bishop
Hardenbrook and the other by a family therapist.352 It may well be that
different rules would govern the revelations in these two different
scenarios.
Suppose that a religion holds that information conveyed in a
confessional cannot be divulged. 35 3 In that event, publication of
information conveyed in therapy might be permissible even if
publication of information conveyed irr a confessional would not be
permissible.3 54 On the other hand, there might be additional public policy
349. Id at 310.
350. Id at 310 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 709 (1976)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at 302.
353. Cf Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of Clergy
from the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1733,
1745 (1996) ("[T]he age old commitment of the Roman Catholic Church to the
inviolability of the confessional secret is no less firm today."); R. Michael Cassidy,
Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the
Clergy-Penitent Privilege? 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1695-96 (2003) ("Canon
law declares the seal of the confessional inviolable, and mandates that matters
revealed attendant to a confession may not be disclosed under any circumstances."
(emphasis added)).
354. Cf Cassidy, supra note 353, at 1721 n.455 ("Roman Catholic priests who
learn about a parishioner's dangerous intentions in a spiritual counseling session
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considerations to preclude public dissemination of communications with
355a therapist. Assuming that there was no threat of harm to another, a
therapist might be liable for making the contents of privileged
discussions public, and a third party who had induced the therapist to
356
breach confidentiality might also be liable.
In Snyder, there was no discussion of whether the therapist
volunteered the confidential information or, instead, had been induced to
do so. 3 " Even if the therapist had not been induced to reveal the
confidential information, a separate issue would be whether a member of
the clergy republishing what he knew had been confidential might be
liable for doing so.358 Perhaps the Snyder court's requiring the defendants
to do more than merely generally allege that "their conduct was religious
in nature" 359 would have some benefit, 36 0 although it would not be
surprising for the defendants to assert with some specificity some of the
religious benefits that might accrue from the revelation at issue.
outside of the confessional are treated exactly like ministers of other religions; that
is, the communication is not privileged, and the priest can be compelled to reveal
it.").
355. See Ileana Dominguez-Urban, The Messenger as the Medium of
Communication: The Use of Interpreters in Mediation, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 33
n.189 (1997) ("[l]t is widely understood that even when there is a well-recognized
confidential relation, confidentiality must give way when it is necessary to prevent
bodily harm to another.").
356. See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy
Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 662-63 (2002) (discussing cases
in which therapists and third parties were held liable for the breach of
confidentiality).
357. In Alberts, an important element was that the minister's superiors had
induced the therapist to breach. See Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113, 121 (Mass.
1985).
358. See Lisa M. Austin, Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of
Justification, 55 McGILL L.J. 165, 180 (2010) (discussing liability "where a third
party discloses information he has received from someone who he knows is under a
duty of confidence").
359. Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal. App. 3d 297, 310 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
360. See Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other People's
Faiths," 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 579, 661 (1993) ("In Snyder, the court was clearly
right to force defendants to identify more particularly whether the purportedly
tortious conduct was religiously motivated.").
Discussions of individuals' failings and of pitfalls that should be avoided
would seem to be exactly the kinds of discussion that would have
religious valuem Further, such an announcement might be made to alert
the congregation so that they would not consort with a sinner and,
perhaps, be led into sin. 36 2
Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville363 involved the question
of whether tort damages could be awarded as a result of a church's
public humiliation of an individual who had already withdrawn from
church membership.364 In 1974, Marian Guinn became a member of the
Collinsville Church of Christ. In 1980, the Church Elders confronted
Guinn about a rumor that she was having an extramarital affair with a
man from Collinsville who was not a member of the Church of Christ
(and not her husband).366 Guinn admitted that she was having an affair.367
On September 21, 1981, Guinn received a letter advising her that
if she did not repent, the withdrawal of fellowship process would
begin.368 On September 25, 1981, Guinn wrote a letter to the Elders
asking them to tell the congregation only that her membership had been
369
withdrawn. On September 27, the Elders ignored her request and read
to the congregation the contents of their September 21 letter to Guinn.3 70
They urged the congregation to contact Guinn and urge her to repent and
to return to the Church. 3 7 1 They also told the congregation that if Guinn
did not repent, the particular scripture that Guinn had violated would be
372
read aloud to the church at the next service.
361. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 326 (1983)
("Christianity, which has strongly influenced Anglo-American law, often seemed to
value public exposure of an individual's faults and weaknesses as a way to stimulate
better behavior in others . . . .").
362. See Snyder, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 302 ("As a result of this conduct,
appellants were shunned by friends, family and members of the congregation.").
363. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
364. See id. at 769, 776.
365. Id. at 767.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 768.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 768-69.
371. Id. at 769.
372. Id.
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During the following week, Guinn met with one of the Elders to
persuade him to refrain from divulging facts about her private life to the
congregation. 373 The Elder informed her that "withdrawing membership
from the Church of Christ was not only doctrinally impossible but it
could not halt the disciplinary sanction being carried out against her."3 74
It was a tenet of the faith that "all its members are a family.375 Just as
"one can be born into a family but can never truly withdraw from it[, a]
Church of Christ member can voluntarily join the church's flock but
cannot then disassociate oneself from it." 37 6 On October 4, Guinn "was
publicly branded a fornicator when the scriptures she had violated were
recited to the Collinsville Church of Christ congregation . . . ." In
addition, as "part of the disciplinary process the same information about
Parishioner's transgressions was sent to four other area Church of Christ
congregations to be read aloud during services."3 78 Guinn sued for
invasion of privacy.379
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that while Guinn was
still a member of the congregation, her "willing submission to the
Church of Christ's dogma, and the Elders' reliance on that submission,
collectively shielded the church's prewithdrawal, religiously-motivated
discipline from scrutiny through secular judicature." 38 0 However, a
separate issue was whether the church was immune from liability for its
punishment of her even after she had withdrawn from the church. The
court reasoned that when Guinn "later removed herself from
membership, Parishioner withdrew her consent, depriving the Church of
the power actively to monitor her spiritual life through overt disciplinary
acts."382 In addition, the court denied that the church had a conditional
privilege to inform the congregants about her private affairs,
distinguishing Guinn from a current or prospective member.383 "Because
373. Id.
374. Id. (emphasis omitted).
375. Id. (emphasis omitted).




380. Id. at 774.
381. See id. at 779.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 784.
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Parishioner was neither a 'present' nor a 'prospective' church member at
the time of the Elders' publication, the members of the Collinsville
congregation did not share the sort of 'common interest' in Parishioner's
behavior that would render the occasion of the publication
'privileged."'
3 84
Guinn highlights a number of issues. First, it is questionable that
an individual who is a member of a congregation thereby consents to a
public airing of very private information to the entire congregation. An
individual who consults a lawyer to prevent such a public revelation
385
should not be construed as consenting to such a revelation. Even were
it plausible to think that by being a member one consented to the
discipline imposed by the church or, perhaps, involved a waiver to object
386
to discipline imposed by the church, as long as it did not involve
physical harm, it would be difficult to assume continuing consent to
such discipline once one ceased to be a member of that church.38 8
A separate issue involves the audience who receives the relevant
information. The public branding of Guinn as a fornicator occurred not
only in the church of which she had formerly been a member but in other
congregations as well.389 This not only increases her harm, but also
undercuts the argument that the public branding was in the common
384. Id. at 785.
385. Cf id. at 768 ("On September 24 her lawyer sent the Elders a letter and
advised them not to expose Parishioner's private life to the Collinsville congregation
which comprised approximately five percent of the town's population.").
386. See id. at 774 ("Parishioner's willing submission to the Church of Christ's
dogma, and the Elders' reliance on that submission, collectively shielded the
church's prewithdrawal, religiously-motivated discipline from scrutiny through
secular judicature.").
387. See id. at 775 ("Although we acknowledge that there may be some
religiously motivated, consensual acts which could constitute a threat to the public
safety, peace or order great enough to fall dehors First Amendment protection, we
hold that, on the record of this case, the Elders' prewithdrawal acts are shielded from
scrutiny by secular judicature.").
388. See id. at 779 ("Parishioner withdrew her consent, depriving the Church
of the power actively to monitor her spiritual life through overt disciplinary acts.").
389. Id. at 769 ("As part of the disciplinary process the same information
about Parishioner's transgressions was sent to four other area Church of Christ
congregations to be read aloud during services.").
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interest of a particular congregation with respect to its own
.390membership.
In Smith v. Calvary Christian Church,391 the Michigan Supreme
Court examined whether an individual having withdrawn from a church
would make the church potentially liable for having publicly divulged
private facts about the individual, namely, that he had consorted with
prostitutes.392 One confusing element of the case was that although the
plaintiff, David Smith, had "submitted a letter withdrawing his formal
membership in the church," 39 3 he had nonetheless remained involved
with the church. 3 94
When the plaintiff first accepted membership in the church, he
specifically consented "not to cause division within the church . . . and
to accept discipline imposed by the church."395 Presumably, the court
believed consenting to discipline included anything that the church
believed acceptable, including divulging embarrassing private facts about
the individual's past.
The Smith court reasoned that because the plaintiff had not
completely withdrawn from the church-he had attended church on the
very day that his private past was revealed-he had not withdrawn from
the church sufficiently to be thought to have withdrawn his consent.396
The Michigan court explained: "Under tort law principles, a person who
consents to another's conduct cannot bring a tort claim for the harm that
follows from that conduct."3 97 The court suggested that plaintiffs "active
engagement with the church indicated his continuing consent,"39 8 and
held that "the church's actions disciplining plaintiff were not tortious." 3 99
It is of course true that plaintiffs cannot consent to some things,
e.g., because they are prohibited by law. The Michigan court commented
that a "more difficult question would be presented if the circumstances of
390. See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (discussing how
overbroad publication undercuts the immunity that might otherwise be available).
391. 614 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000).
392. See id. at 591.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. (emphasis added).
396. Id. at 594.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 595.
399. Id.
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the discipline were different, for example, if the discipline was in
violation of the Michigan Penal Code." However, one might wonder why
that would be difficult, since one would assume that such consent would
be held void as against public policy.
The Michigan Supreme Court claimed that "consent is the
relevant consideration."400 If that were so, then one might expect a fact-
intensive inquiry where the trier of fact would weigh whether the
plaintiff subjectively consented to continued discipline, e.g., by
examining the statements that he made or other evidence. Or, the trier of
fact might examine whether the plaintiff might have been (objectively)
understood to have consented, e.g., by considering both that he had
formally withdrawn and that he had nonetheless shown up at a meeting
where he knew that he would be discussed. Perhaps the latter should be
thought to indicate that he considered himself still part of the church. Or,
perhaps, he was merely showing up to defend himself against what he
perceived to be inappropriate action.4 0' Instead, the Michigan Supreme
Court held as a matter of law that Smith consented to this discipline,
because "reasonable minds cannot disagree that plaintiff consented to the
church's practices, and manifested his continuing consent by remaining
actively engaged with the church."40 2
The court's claim that reasonable minds could not disagree about
whether Smith continued to consent is simply false. Perhaps he did not
consent, but he thought that the information about him would not be
revealed if he were present.403 Perhaps he went there as an outsider who
wished to educate the congregation about the "correct" interpretation of
400. Id. at 594.
401. See Lloyd G. Grandy II, Thou Shalt Not Leave Thy Church: So Sayeth the
Michigan Supreme Court in Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 6 T.M. COOLEY J.
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 47, 49 (2003) ("The day for the marking was set for December
8, 1996. The pastor went to Mr. Smith's wife and family, cautioned them about what
was to occur, and advised them not to be present on that day . . . . Mr. Smith
attended the church and was present while the pastor proceeded with the marking. . .
402. See Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 614 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Mich.
2000).
403. Grandy, supra note 401, at 64 (hypothesizing that Smith "was simply
trying to dodge the discipline of the church").
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religious doctrine.404 Perhaps he did consent to discipline. In short, a
reasonable person might have reached any of a number of conclusions
about whether Smith still consented to the church's imposing discipline
on him.
Holding that Smith had consented as a matter of law was bad
enough, but the Smith court offered additional reasons for congregants to
worry about the kinds of actions that might be taken against them. For
example, the Michigan Supreme Court referred to Guinn,40 5 commenting
that "[h]ad the church taken its action toward a person more comparable
to the plaintiff in Guinn, a more difficult question would be
,,406
presented. So, too, the court commented that "a more difficult
question would be presented if the circumstances of the discipline were
different, for example, if the discipline was in violation of the Michigan
Penal Code. 407 But if it is merely a more difficult question when the
church's discipline is in violation of law or imposed on individuals who
are not members of the church, then the possible immunity extended to
the church may well be much too broad and must be revisited.
The Smith court worried that "[a]llowing a person who was a
member of a religious body or consented to such a body's practices to
escape discipline for actions that occurred during the period of
membership or consent by severing ties to that body could undermine the
efficacy of the body's disciplinary practices toward its remaining
,,408members. While that may be so, courts should not pretend that
consent has been given to a practice when a much different rationale is at
work. Further, if the test is whether the efficacy of the church's
disciplinary practices towards its members might be made less
efficacious if immunity is not accorded, then a whole host of church
practices might be immunized for fear that otherwise the effectiveness of
the church's discipline might be undermined.
404. See Smith, 614 N.W.2d at 594 ("[H]e was present and participating in a
doctrinal dispute in the church on the day he was marked."). The court implied that
one of the reasons that he could not sue the church was that he had attempted to
change their beliefs. See id. (noting that Smith had "attempted to influence the
church's congregation, even on the very day he was being marked").
405. Id. at 593-95. For a discussion of Guinn, see supra notes 363-90 and
accompanying text.
406. Smith, 614 N.W.2d at 595.
407. Id
408. Id. at 594 n.L1.
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In Westbrook v. Penley,409 the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether a pastor, who was also a licensed professional marriage
counselor, was liable for revealing information learned from a former
congregant during secular counseling.4 10 Peggy Lee Penley had received
marriage counseling from Westbrook, a licensed professional marriage
counselor.411 Later, Penley and Westbrook helped form a new church,
CrossLand Community Bible Church, and Westbrook was elected
pastor.412 After Penley had separated from her husband, she and her
husband received counseling at Westbrook's home, where couples from
the church discussed ways to improve their marriages.4 13 Penley testified
that the Bible was not discussed at these meetings and she considered
them a continuation of the secular counseling she had previously
received from Westbrook.4 14
One marital counseling session that Penley and her husband
attended turned out not to have any other couples attending.415 During a
break, Penley spoke separately with Westbrook and informed him both
that she was going to divorce her husband and that she had engaged in an
416extramarital sexual relationship. Westbrook recommended an attorney
but also discussed the church discipline that would be required as a result
of her extramarital relationship.4 17 She told him that she was resigning
from the church.4 18 Thereafter, Westbrook wrote a letter to the
congregation explaining that "Penley intended to divorce her husband,
there was no biblical basis for the divorce, she had engaged in a
'biblically inappropriate' relationship with another man, and she had
rejected efforts to bring her to repentance and reconciliation." 419 In
addition, the letter "encouraged the congregation to 'break fellowship'
with Penley in order to obtain her repentance and restoration to the
409. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
410. Id. at 391 ("[W]e presume the counseling at issue was purely secular in
nature as Penley claims.").
411. Id. at 392.
412. Id.
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church body,"420 although the letter encouraged the members of the
421
congregation not to divulge any of this information to non-members.
Penley sued Westbrook for defamation, negligence, and breach
422 423
of fiduciary duty. All claims were dismissed by the trial court. The
appellate court affirmed with respect to all causes of action except the
professional negligence claim, "which it held concerned Westbrook's
role as Penley's secular professional counselor and did not invoke First
Amendment concerns."424
Penley argued that "Westbrook's breach of [the] secular duty to
maintain confidentiality . . . caused her injury."425 She urged the court
"to apply the neutral-principles approach to her professional-negligence
claim, contending her claim can be resolved under neutral tort principles
without resorting to or infringing upon religious doctrine."426 But, the
court explained, a "church's decision to discipline members for conduct
considered outside of the church's moral code is an inherently religious
function with which civil courts should not generally interfere." 42 7
Yet, the court's reasoning that churches should be free to
discipline their members did not seem applicable in a case in which the
plaintiff was no longer a member of the church when the discipline was
applied.428 That she was a former member did not seem relevant to the
court because "Penley's voluntary forfeiture of her membership did not,
in CrossLand's or Westbrook's view, forestall the church's duty under its
constitution to 'tell it to the church' and admonish church members to
'break fellowship with [Penley]."' 4 29 The court did not discuss whether
the same rationale would permit congregants to reveal private
confidences or defame individuals who had never been members of the
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id at 394.
423. Id
424. Id.
425. Id. at 396.
426. Id. at 399.
427. Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (Wall. 13) 679, 727 (1871)).
428. Jana R. McCreary, Tell Me No Secrets: Sharing, Discipline, and the
Clash of Ecclesiastical Abstention and Psychotherapeutic Confidentiality, 29
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 77, 83 (2011) ("In spite of Penley's resignation, Westbrook
proceeded with CCBC's disciplinary process.").
429. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 404. (Tex. 2007).
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church as long as the congregants believed it their religious duty to
spread the truth.
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that civil
courts lack the competence to decide religious questions, such as the
proper interpretation of religious doctrine, policy, or practice.430 The civil
courts are also precluded from deciding who is best qualified to be
chosen as a religious leader.431 However, that doctrine has been
overextended to immunize defamation or the publication of private facts
merely because this conduct involves a minister. The kinds of
consideration that should defeat an assertion of qualified immunity, e.g.,
that a false assertion made with malice had no reasonable basis in fact,
should defeat an immunity claim even when the assertion is made within
a religious institution. Assessment of damages is a separate matter, and it
may well be too difficult to tell in certain cases whether defamatory
allegations in fact caused someone not to be hired or rehired.
Nonetheless, knowing and malicious defamation should not be
countenanced even in the religious context.
So, too, a knowing breach of confidentiality about a minister
should not be countenanced, absent the kind of justification that normally
excuses or requires a breach of confidentiality. Whether tort damages
should be awarded for a breach is a civil rather than religious question,
and confidentiality breaches should not be immunized merely because
they are authorized under religious doctrine.
Defamation and publication of private facts jurisprudence also
needs revision when the harmed party is a current or former parishioner.
One should not be presumed to consent to defamation or to a breach of
confidentiality merely by virtue of being a member of a congregation,
and one's being a former member of a congregation certainly does not
provide the basis for such an assumption. Precisely because religious
doctrines can vary widely, the fact that such practices might be
religiously authorized should not provide a complete defense to such
actions. Courts must stop pretending that the Constitution requires
430. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
43 1. See id.
3832013]
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affording immunity to public humiliation and character assassination-
providing such immunity does not promote the interests of religious
institutions, their members, or the public at large.
